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SUMMARY
1
In March 1999 the Department of Social Security (DSS) commissioned
the Social Policy R esearch Unit at the University of York to carry out
research into local authorities’ policies, procedures and practices in relation
to Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit overpayments.
Local authorities have a statutory duty to classify benefit overpayments
according to their cause.  The principal causes are local authority error,
claimant error and fraud.  Local authorities receive a 95 per cent subsidy
from the DSS on correct claims, 80 per cent on fraud overpayments, 25
per cent on overpayments due to claimant error, and zero per cent on
local authority errors.  These rates are intended to encourage local
authorities to reduce the incidence of overpayments.
Local authorities are expected to make efforts to recover overpaid benefits.
They can retain any monies recovered.  This is intended to act as a
financial incentive to encourage the vigorous pursuit of overpayments.
The Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 (the ‘Fraud Act’)
extended the powers of local authorities to recover overpayments from
landlords, and introduced new procedures for the recovery of
overpayments through the civil courts.  The Act also introduced new
administrative penalties for use against fraudulent claimants.
The objective of the research was to explore and analyse the decisions,
experiences and suggestions of local authorities regarding (a) their policies
on overpayments, (b) the classification of overpayments, (c) the recovery
of overpayments and (d) the 1997 Fraud Act.
The research methods used were primarily qualitative.  Interviews were
conducted with 82 local authority staff in 18 local authorities in Great
Britain in the early summer of 1999.  In addition, the published reports
of the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) were analysed.
None of the authorities in the study had a formal written policy in relation
to overpayments in the sense of a document setting out the principles,
aims and objectives that informed their overpayment work and strategies
for achieving those ends.
Instead, local authorities had well-established structures and procedures
for dealing with overpayments.  Some had developed procedure manuals
while others relied on the guidance circulars from DSS to equip staff to
carry out overpayment work.
Introduction (Chapter 1)
Policy background (Section 1.1)
Research aims and questions
(Section 1.2)
Research design and methods
(Section 1.3)
Local authority policies on
overpayments (Chapter 2)
‘Policy’ content and documentation
(Sections 2.1-2.4)
2The principal aims behind the organisation of overpayment work were
the pursuit of good administration and to keep administrative costs low.
No authority had adopted a policy of treating overpayments caused by
fraud differently compared with overpayments caused by error.
Importantly, it was found that the current financial subsidy and incentive
measures did not affect local authorities’ approaches to overpayment
classification or recovery.
In some authorities the reports of the BFI had been influential in recent
thinking about overpayments work.  Some managers are having to manage
a potential tension between overpayment policy and their other authority’s
policies, such as anti-poverty strategies.
Analysis of local authority subsidy data showed that in 1997/ 98 the value
of identified overpayments was £ 440 million of which £ 358 million
were in relation to Housing Benefit.  DSS subsidy data indicated that the
majority of overpayments (71 per cent) were the result of claimant error.
Just over a fifth (21 per cent) were caused by fraud.  The National Housing
Benefit Accuracy R eview for the same year analysed a sample of cases to
estimate the amount of confirmed and strongly suspected fraud.  It
concluded that £ 840 million was lost in incorrect payments of Housing
Benefit alone.  Although these sources of data are not directly comparable,
the size of the difference suggests the need for further investigation.
Classification of overpayments caused by error was largely a routine
administrative task carried out by staff on benefit assessment teams.  It is
a process which is automated to varying degrees depending on the
specification of an authority’s computer system.  Classification of
overpayments caused by fraud was, in contrast, carried out manually.
There was no evidence that authorities deliberately classified overpayments
wrongly, either as fraud or as claimant error, in order to increase subsidy
payments obtained from central government.  Nor was there any evidence
that authority staff were failing to identify and record overpayments in
order to increase subsidy payments.
The published reports of the BFI reveal a picture of widely varying
standards in the classification of overpayments by local authorities.  Some
authorities inspected by BFI appeared to have low standards of performance
in relation to overpayment classification.  However, the reports do not
conclude that the classification system is being abused in order to avoid a
subsidy penalty.
Little use is being made by local authorities of information about
overpayment classifications as a management tool to identify problems
and inform improvements in practice.
Aims underlying overpayment
‘policy’ (Section 2.5)
Influences of overpayment ‘policy’
(Section 2.6)
Classification of overpayments
(Chapter 3)
Data on the amount and the causes
of overpayments (Sections 3.1-3.3)
How classifications are carried out
(Section 3.4)
BFI evaluations of overpayment
classifications (Section 3.5)
Information of overpayment
classification (Section 3.6)
3Very little is known about how much overpaid Housing Benefit and
Council Tax Benefit is actually recovered by local authorities.  Neither
the DSS nor local authorities collect data on overpayment recoveries
routinely or systematically.  BFI inspection reports suggest that local
authorities’ performance on the recovery of overpayments varies widely
and that many authorities do not have the technical capacity to produce
robust and complete information about recoveries.
Local authorities have a statutory duty to decide if an overpayment is
recoverable in law.  In practice, the large majority of overpayments
identified are deemed recoverable.  The research showed that some
authorities do not routinely make decisions about the recoverability of
overpayments caused by official error, even though they are required to
by law.
Local authorities are under no legal obligation to recover an overpayment
of benefit.  However, they are expected by central government to make
serious attempts to recover all recoverable overpayments.  In practice, it
was found that recovery action is taken in most cases.  There was no
evidence that in the authorities visited during the research project, Housing
Benefit or other authority staff ignored or avoided their responsibility to
seek recovery.
In most cases the method of recovery is an automatic choice determined
by the type of benefit overpaid and the current status of the claimant.  All
authorities used a standard range of recovery methods - deduction from
ongoing Housing Benefit, posting to a rent or Council Tax account, and
sundry debtor invoices - which accounted for the majority of their
recovery actions. All authorities pursued recovery through the civil courts
as a method of last resort when other recovery attempts had not succeeded.
The extent to which other methods of recovery were used varied
considerably between the authorities visited.  Most authorities rarely, if
at all, sought repayment from other social security benefits administered
by the Benefits Agency, from other local authorities, or used debt
collection agencies.
Authorities had very varied experiences of handling appeals against
overpayment decisions, but appeals appeared to have little impact on the
administration of overpayments, or of benefits more widely.
Overpayment recovery was not the responsibility of a single local authority
department or official.  No department or individual officer had ownership
of overpayments.  R ecovery work was usually distributed between at
least five local authority departments (Housing Benefit, Council Tax,
Housing, Finance and Legal).
R ecoverability and recovery of
overpayments (Chapter 4)
Data on the recovery of
overpayments (Sections 4.1-4.3)
Recoverability (Section 4.4)
Deciding whether to recover
(Section 4.5)
Principal methods of recovery
(Section 4.6)
Alternative means of recovering
overpayments (Section 4.7)
Appeals (Section 4.8)
Recovery issues relevant to
overpayment policy (Section 4.9)
4The gap in the information collected by local authorities about the amounts
and the types of overpayments recovered has important implications for
any attempts to measure and compare the recovery performance of
different local authorities.
The 1997 Fraud Act included a number of measures relevant to
overpayments:
• the extension of local authorities’ powers to recover overpayments
from landlords;
• the introduction of new civil court procedures to simplify and speed
up the process of obtaining a court judgment against debtors;
• the introduction of a system of administrative penalties for fraudulent
claimants.
The new powers in relation to recovery from landlords were being used
occasionally in appropriate cases by some authorities and not at all in
others.  They were viewed mainly positively as a useful addition to a
local authority’s ability to recover overpayments.
The new civil court procedures were only just beginning to be used in a
few authorities, where they were viewed positively as a welcome
replacement for the previous costly and time-consuming procedures.
Awareness and knowledge of the new powers, however, were not high.
The new system of administrative penalties had been used on only a few
occasions.  Its use was seen as very limited.  To impose an administrative
penalty local authorities are required to gather sufficient supporting
evidence to justify prosecution.  There was a feeling that when such a
stage had been reached on a case of suspected fraud, prosecution was the
preferred course of action rather than offering the choice of an
administrative penalty to the claimant.
In developing future policy on overpayments, options lie not only in
improving local authorities’ performance in relation to overpayments,
but also in possible changes to the benefit schemes themselves and in the
behaviour and actions of claimants, landlords and other third parties.  A
range of  policy ideas were discussed with the respondents interviewed.
Many ideas emerged as their own suggestions, others were prompted by
the reports of the BFI, whilst some were formulated by the research team
from their reflections on the interviews and analysis of the data.
Overpayment work is currently spread among a number of departments
in many local authorities.  However, some Housing Benefit managers
suggested that there may be advantages in bringing responsibility for
overpayment administration and performance under a single management
command.  It was thought that there is merit in exploring this option in
some detail with local authorities and their organisations.
The impact of the Social
Security Administration (Fraud)
Act 1997 (Chapter 5)
Introduction (Section 5.1)
Extended powers to recover
overpayments from landlords
(Section 5.2)
New civil court procedures
(Section 5.3)
Administrative penalties
(Section 5.4)
Conclusion and issues for policy
development (Chapter 6)
5The finding that the current subsidy and financial incentives arrangements
for overpayments have little influence on the activities of local authorities
raises a number of questions:
• Are financial incentives and subsidies the right policy instruments for
encouraging local authorities to reduce the number of overpayments
and to increase the amount of overpaid benefit recovered?
• Are subsidies ineffective because they are not set at the right levels?
Would changes in the levels restore the effectiveness of subsidies?
• Would the financial incentives be more effective if there was ownership
of overpayment work in local authorities?
Overpayment incentives were found to be ineffective at present.  An
alternative to incentive payments is to use performance measurement as
the basis for motivating local authorities to reduce overpayments and
increase recoveries.  Establishing ownership of overpayments work would
also create the opportunity of linking the current incentive arrangements
to performance.
Information on the incidence, value and causes of overpayments is already
collected by local authorities.  This is a rich source of data from which to
develop performance indicators and targets.  In contrast many authorities
are not well placed to collect recovery data.  There is a case for developing
a comprehensive set of indicators which will allow a balanced assessment
of an authority’s performance and provide authority managers with
information that they can use to monitor recovery performance in detail.
The prospects for preventing overpayments will be improved by
implementation of the Housing Benefit Verification Framework which
requires local authorities to verify information in relation to new and
repeat claims and to introduce rigorous systems of claims monitoring and
reviews.  Other ideas for reducing overpayments included increasing
administrative resources for Housing Benefit departments, better education
of claimants and landlords so that changes in circumstances were reported
timeously, a better service from the Benefits Agency and the Employment
Service, more frequent reviews of claims in payment, and shorter award
periods so that overpayments did not continue for long periods of time.
Simplification of the rules of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit
was also discussed as a possible way of reducing the incidence of
overpayments.
The dominant view among the Housing Benefit staff interviewed is that
there is no compelling need to extend the current range of methods for
the recovery of overpayments.  However, in its reports the BFI has
criticised some authorities for not recovering more overpayments from
benefits paid by the Benefits Agency.  An option for consideration raised
by local authority staff in the study is to allow local authority staff access
to claimants’ Benefits Agency records so that deductions for overpayments
can be made directly.
6Models of funding based on counter-fraud initiatives might provide ideas
for the future funding of overpayment work.  Consideration could also
be given to extending the roles of the DSS and BFI in relation to
overpayments, to encourage more local authorities to make better use of
the range of powers and provisions already at their disposal, and to take
advantage of new opportunities to prevent and recover overpayments.
7In March 1999 the Department of Social Security (DSS) commissioned
the Social Policy R esearch Unit to carry out research into local authorities’
policies, procedures and practices in relation to Housing Benefit and
Council Tax Benefit overpayments.
Housing Benefit is a national, means-tested, social security benefit that
can be claimed by anyone on a low income who pays rent.  Housing
Benefit is paid in the form of a rent rebate to tenants of local authorities, or
as a rent allowance to tenants in private sector accommodation or social
housing (such as that run by Housing Associations).  Council Tax Benefit
can be claimed by any Council Tax payer on a low income.  It is paid in
the form of a rebate on a person’s Council Tax bill.  Both benefits are
administered by local authorities on behalf of central government.
The rules setting out the eligibility criteria for Housing Benefit and Council
Tax Benefit and the rules for calculating entitlement are contained in
legislation.  However, local authorities have considerable autonomy in
the way they organise the administration of benefits.
Overpayments of benefit occur when a claimant is paid an amount of
benefit to which he or she is not entitled under the regulations.  They
may be the result of one of a number of causes, including:
• official error, by local authorities, or by government departments such
as DSS, the Benefits Agency (BA) and the Department for Education
and Employment (DfEE);
• claimant error;
• fraud;
• other causes, such as an overpayment following the death of a claimant,
or a backdated benefit increase.
Overpayments are a problem for the social security system. According to
the National Housing Benefit Accuracy R eview for 1997/ 98 the amount
of Housing Benefit lost to error and fraud was in the order of £ 840
million in the year (Government Statistical Service, 1998).1   Overpayments
not only represent a drain on public resources, they also create difficulties
for claimants and the benefit authorities alike.  The government has
expressed a commitment to reducing the problem of overpayments
through its programmes to modernise the welfare system and by its
INTRODUCTION1
1.1  Policy background
1 From data supplied to DSS by local authorities for the purposes of claiming government
subsidy, the amount of overpaid Housing Benefit in 1997/ 98 was £ 232 million, and
£ 323 million when Council Tax Benefit overpayments are added.  This apparent
discrepancy in the size of the overpayment problem is discussed further in Chapter 3.
8counter-fraud strategies. In the welfare reform Green Paper New Ambitions
for Our Country (DSS, 1997), two of the measures of success set out by
the government are:
• a reduction in the amount of money lost in fraudulent payments; and
• a reduction in the number of incorrect payments (p.84).
The later Green Paper on social security fraud (DSS, 1998) presents
recovery of overpayments as part of a framework of sanctions that prevents
claimants from gaining from fraud and sends a powerful deterrent message
to potential fraudsters.  The government’s fraud strategy paper Safeguarding
Social Security, published in March 1999 (DSS, 1999), acknowledges that
debt recovery ‘is a neglected area’ (para. 4.10) and that the ‘record on the
recovery of overpayments must be improved’ (para. 4.23).  R educing
programme loss and, consequently the cost to the taxpayer, are clearly set
out as objectives for future policy and practice (para. 4.3 and 4.23).  The
paper also places the recovery of overpayments in the wider context of a
regime of sanctions and deterrence (para. 4.14).
Central government has built incentives into the mechanisms for
subsidising local authorities for Housing Benefit administration to
encourage them to detect and recover overpayments.  There is evidence,
however, that levels of overpayments remain high and that there are
considerable variations among local authorities in the value of
overpayments, in the relative number of overpayments caused by fraud
and error, and in the percentage of overpaid benefit they recover from
claimants and landlords.  The National Audit Office has drawn attention
to what it calls shortcomings in the way in which subsidies are paid in
relation to overpayments which leave the subsidy arrangements ‘open to
abuse’, by, for example, encouraging local authorities to classify
overpayments as due to fraud in order to generate maximum income
(NAO, 1997, p.51).
Local authorities administer and pay Housing Benefit and Council Tax
Benefit on behalf of the DSS. R ent allowances, non-Housing R evenue
Account (HR A) rent rebates, rent rebates in Scotland and Council Tax
Benefits that are correctly paid by authorities are reimbursed at the rate
of 95 per cent of expenditure.2   However, this rate of subsidy is lower
for most overpaid benefit. The policy intention here is that the lower
rates of subsidy will encourage authorities to administer the Housing
Benefit scheme efficiently and securely.
1.1.1  Classification and subsidy
2 The Department for the Environment, Transport and the R egions (DETR ) and the
National Assembly for Wales are responsible for paying subsidy for HR A rent rebate
expenditure in England and Wales.
9The subsidy arrangements as they relate to overpayments are complicated.
However, the principal rates of subsidy paid by DSS are as follows:
• 95 per cent subsidy on overpayments caused by official error in the
DSS or DfEE;
• 80 per cent subsidy on overpayments caused by fraud (before April
1998 the rate was 95 per cent);
• 25 per cent subsidy on overpayments caused by claimant error or other
causes;
• zero per cent subsidy on overpayments caused by local authority error.
The differential rates of subsidy are intended to provide an incentive for
local authorities to prevent overpayments from occurring.  Local
authorities have a responsibility to identify, record and classify each
overpayment according to its cause in order to be able to claim the correct
rate of subsidy from central government.
When an overpayment has been identified by a local authority, a decision
must be made as to whether it is recoverable in law.  This is a statutory
decision governed by regulations.  All overpayments caused by claimant
error or fraud are recoverable.  However, overpayments caused by local
authority error are only recoverable if the recipient of the benefit could
reasonably be expected to have known that they were being overpaid.
Once an overpayment has been deemed recoverable the local authority
is under no statutory obligation to recover the overpaid amount.  It can
exercise its own discretion in deciding whether or not to recover.
However, it is expected that an authority, while having due regard to an
individual claimant’s circumstances, will nevertheless make a serious
attempt to recoup the overpaid benefit.
Local authorities have a variety of means at their disposal for attempting
recovery, including:
• recovery from ongoing Housing Benefit payments to a claimant, a
landlord or the person to whom the benefit was paid;
• recovery from a council tenant’s rent account;
• recovery through a Council Tax account;
• issuing a sundry debtor invoice;
• deductions from other social security benefits paid to the claimant;
• employing a commercial debt recovery agency;
• recovery through the civil courts.
An important feature of the overpayment arrangements is that local
authorities can keep the full amount of any monies recovered.  This is
intended to act as a strong incentive to local authorities to pursue the
recovery of overpayments.
1.1.2  Recovery of overpayments
10
The Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 (usually referred to
as the ‘1997 Fraud Act’) included a number of measures relevant to
overpayments.  These were:
• the extension of local authorities’ powers to recover overpayments
from landlords;
• the introduction of new civil court procedures to simplify and speed
up the process of obtaining a court judgment against debtors;
• the introduction of a system of administrative penalties for fraudulent
claimants as an alternative to prosecution.
The first two of these are primarily intended to improve the recovery of
overpayments from claimants and landlords, and thereby act as a deterrent
to potential fraudsters.  The administrative penalty provisions allow local
authorities to offer a claimant the opportunity of paying a penalty
equivalent to 30 per cent of the overpayment obtained by fraud as an
alternative to criminal prosecution.  The penalty is added to the amount
that the authority can recover from the claimant.  The penalty does not
directly affect recovery but is an addition to the sanctions that local
authorities can apply to fraudulent claimants. It acts as a punishment but
is also intended to serve as a deterrent.
In recent years overpayments have come under the scrutiny of a number
of public bodies including the National Audit Office (NAO), the Audit
Commission, the Commons Select Committee on Social Security and
the Committee for Public Accounts, mainly in the context of the major
policy and public interest in social security fraud.
Official reports by, for example, the Committee for Public Accounts
(1998), and the NAO (1999), have contained a number of criticisms of
overpayment policy and practice in local authorities, the main thrust of
which are that:
• local authorities do not make sufficient effort to seek repayments from
people who have obtained Housing Benefit fraudulently;
• perverse incentives are created by a combination of the subsidies paid
on overpaid benefit, the system of rewards for identifying and stopping
fraud (known as weekly benefit savings), and the rules that allow
authorities to keep any recoveries of overpayments;
• local authority performance in recovering overpayments is not as good
as it should be.
In its responses to such criticisms, the DSS cites recent developments
that should promote the improvement of local authority performance,
such as the work of the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (BFI), and the new
provisions in the 1997 Fraud Act to increase local authorities’ powers to
recover overpaid benefit.  The Department has also confirmed its view
that sufficient financial incentives are already in place to encourage local
authorities to pursue overpayment recovery (NAO, 1999).
1.1.3  Official criticism of
overpayment policy and performance
11
The BFI was set up under the provisions of the 1997 Fraud Act to inspect
local authority and DSS agency practices and performance in relation to
reducing fraud in the social security system.  It publishes detailed inspection
reports on individual authorities which include an assessment of their
work on overpayments.  By the end of August 1999, 23 local authority
reports had been published by the BFI, and had been analysed for the
purposes of this research report.  Criticisms frequently made in the BFI
reports included:
• a lack of management responsibility for overpayment work;
• a lack of management systems and information for controlling and
monitoring overpayment work;
• a failure to recover overpayments from other social security benefits
received by claimants;
• a failure to use the new powers to recover overpayments from landlords.
The central objective of this research was to explore and analyse the
decisions, experiences and suggestions of local authorities regarding the
recording, classification and recovery of Housing Benefit and Council
Tax Benefit overpayments.  Our enquiries therefore covered local
authority policies, administrative procedures and practices, and the perceptions
and beliefs of local authority staff which informed policy and practice.
The detailed research questions, summarised below, fell into four broad
categories relating to (a) local authority policies on overpayments, (b) the
classification of overpayments,(c) the recovery of overpayments and (d)
the provisions of the 1997 Fraud Act as they affect overpayments.
Local authority policies on overpayments
• What is each authority’s policy on the classification and recovery of
overpayments?
• Who is responsible for drawing up the policy?
• What objectives underlie the authority’s policy?
• What have been the principal influences on policy (including the impact
of DSS subsidy arrangements and incentive measures)?
• Are there differences in policy for rent rebates, rent allowances, or
Council Tax Benefit?
• Are there differences in policy for overpayments resulting from fraud
compared with claimant or official errors?
• Are there differences in policy for claimants and landlords?
Classification of overpayments
• Who is responsible for classifying overpayments?
• How do staff classify overpayments in practice?
• What influences their decisions?
• What information do local authorities collect on the classification of
overpayments?
1.2  R esearch aims and
questions
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Recovery of overpayments
• Who decides whether an overpayment is recoverable?
• How are the regulations on recoverability interpreted and actioned?
• Who is responsible for recovering overpayments?
• How are decisions not to recover made?
• What methods of recovery are used?
• Who makes decisions about the recovery method to use in each case?
• What influences decisions about the method of recovery?
• What information do local authorities collect on the recovery of
overpayments?
• How successful are authorities in recovering overpayments?
• How are relations with claimants and landlords handled (including in
the event of an appeal)?
The 1997 Fraud Act
• How frequently have the new overpayment provisions been used?
• Why have some authorities apparently not made use of their new
powers?
• How useful and effective have the new provisions been so far?
• How do local authorities view their use of the new powers now and
in the future?
The main element of the research design was qualitative fieldwork in 18
local authorities in Great Britain, comprising interviews with staff engaged
in some way in work on overpayments.  After the fieldwork had been
completed, a workshop for Housing Benefit managers was held in order
to discuss emerging findings and to explore some of the options for policy
development.  The preparation for the fieldwork and the later analysis of
fieldwork data were informed by a study of published BFI local authority
reports.
In each local authority interviews were held with members of the authority
staff who had been identified as key respondents in earlier preparatory
telephone interviews with Housing Benefit managers.  The type and
number of staff interviewed varied between the authorities visited but
included the following:
• Housing Benefit managers;
• team leaders and supervisors;
• processing and assessment staff;
• overpayment recovery staff;
• fraud officers;
• legal officers.
1.3  R esearch design and
methods
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In total, 82 staff were interviewed, usually singly but occasionally in pairs.
The interviews were taped and transcribed for analysis.  Fieldwork took
place in May and June 1999.  The topic guides used in the interviews are
included in this report at Appendix A.
The 18 local authorities were selected on the basis of a range of criteria
considered to have a possible influence on a local authority’s policy and
practice regarding overpayments, or to be a reflection of their performance:
• Type of authority - i.e. London Borough, Metropolitan authority, District
or Unitary authority, Scottish authority, Welsh authority.
• Size of authority - defined by Housing Benefit caseload.
• Level of overpayments - defined using subsidy data supplied by DSS.
• Overpayment recovery rates -  using data from a DSS exercise on
overpayment recovery that took place in 1998.
• Political control - before the local government elections in May 1999.
• Size of private rented sector - based on the number of private sector
tenants.
• Privatisation - defined by the existence of a contract with a private
sector company to provide benefit administration services to the
authority.
• Contact with BFI - defined as authorities who had been visited by the
BFI before 31 December 1998.
Twenty-three local authorities were approached in order for the target
sample to be reached.  The achieved sample comprised three London
Boroughs, three Metropolitan authorities, eight District and Unitary
authorities, two Scottish authorities, and two Welsh authorities.  Further
details of the characteristics of the achieved sample are presented in
Appendix B.
Chapters 2 to 5 reflect the main information needs of the Department as
set out in its research specification.  Hence, they deal respectively with
local authority policies regarding overpayments, the classification of
overpayments, recovery methods and performance, and the impact of
the 1997 Fraud Act.  Each chapter presents the research findings and
concludes with a discussion of the policy issues raised.
Chapter 2 presents the findings on local authority policies regarding
overpayments.  It provides a description of the types of documentation
used to inform overpayment work in the 18 local authorities visited, and
an analysis of the approaches taken to decision making regarding classifying
overpayments, recoverability, and recovery.  The aims and objectives
that underlie local authority policies and the principal influences on local
authority thinking are examined.  Chapter 3 deals with the classification
of overpayments.  It begins with a description of the main causes of
overpayments and presents background statistical data based on an analysis
1.4  Structure of the report
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of the 1997/ 98 Housing Benefit subsidy returns to the DSS.  The chapter
also describes how classifications are made in practice by Housing Benefit
staff and discusses the use of information on classification by local authority
managers.
Chapter 4 presents the research findings on the recovery of overpayments.
There is a brief review of the extent of current knowledge about the
recovery of overpayments drawn from available sources.  Decision making
on whether overpayments are recoverable and whether recovery action
should be attempted are then explored.  The chapter examines in detail
the principal and the less frequently used methods of recovery utilised by
local authorities.  There follows a discussion of a number of issues relating
to the recovery of overpayments that are relevant for thinking about the
future direction of policy, including the ‘ownership’ of recovery work,
measuring recovery performance and the link between recovery and the
deterrence of fraud.  Chapter 5 is concerned with the impact of the 1997
Fraud Act and examines the use of the extension of local authorities’
powers to recover overpayments from landlords, the introduction of new
civil court procedures, and the introduction of a system of administrative
penalties for fraudulent claimants.
In the final chapter we draw on the full range of other research findings
and insights from local authority staff to present a discussion of a range of
options for overpayments policy.
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LOCAL AUTHORITY POLICIES ON OVERPAYMENTS2
One of the key aims of the research was to explore local authorities’
policies on Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit overpayments.  As
explained in Chapter 1, the principal research questions we set out to
address were as follows:
• What is each authority’s policy on the classification and recovery of
overpayments?
• Who is responsible for drawing up the policy?
• What objectives underlie the authority’s policy?
• What have been the principal influences on policy?
• Are there differences in policy for rent rebates, rent allowances, or
Council Tax Benefit?
• Are there differences in policy for overpayments resulting from fraud
compared with claimant or official errors?
• Are there differences in policy for claimants and landlords?
In constructing these research questions we were intending to unpick
policy in terms of the principles, aims and objectives that informed each
local authority’s overpayment work and its strategy for achieving those
ends.  There was an expectation that the formation of policy (rather than
administrative procedures) would ultimately be the responsibility of the
elected members of the authority and possibly senior officials at, for
example, Chief Executive or Director level.
During the early preparatory stages of the project, however, it became
clear that we would have to revise these assumptions.  It was apparent
that we were unlikely to find many authorities with a clear, written
statement of its overpayment policy to which elected members or senior
officials had contributed.  This expectation was confirmed in preliminary
interviews with Housing Benefit managers and later in the fieldwork
visits: not one of the 18 authorities in the study had a written policy
document on overpayments.  In addition, we were unable to identify
any authority in which either elected members or senior officials made
identifiable contributions to the way in which overpayments were dealt
with in the authority (although some did intervene in individual cases on
behalf of claimants).
Consequently, our discussions during fieldwork regarding ‘policy’ were
restricted to Housing Benefit staff at management level and often began
with descriptions of current procedures and practices for the recovery of
overpayments.  From there it was possible to engage in a discussion about
the reasons why particular practices were adopted.  In this way, we were
able to piece together some understanding of the approach to overpayment
2.1  Introduction
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recovery in each authority and how that approach was operationalised.
The notion of a ‘policy’ towards the classification of overpayments was
more difficult for local authority staff to grasp.
In reading this chapter, therefore, it should be remembered that the idea
of a policy towards overpayments did not have an immediate resonance
with most of the local authority staff interviewed. The question of whether
this implies that there is a gap here that needs to be filled or leads to the
conclusion that a formal policy is largely irrelevant will be returned to at
the end of the chapter.
This chapter begins with a description of the types of documentation
used to inform overpayment work that we found in the 18 fieldwork
local authorities.  The next section presents an analysis of the approaches
taken to decision making regarding classifying overpayments,
recoverability, and recovery.  We identify some differences in the
treatment of particular overpayment cases.  The following section attempts
to summarise the aims and objectives that lie behind existing overpayment
‘policies’.  The next section explores the main influences on overpayment
work, including the impacts of subsidy arrangements, the 1997 Fraud
Act, and external scrutiny by organisations such as the Benefit Fraud
Inspectorate (BFI) and the Audit Commission. In the penultimate section,
the relationship between overpayments and other local authority policies
is considered.  The final section draws out the main policy issues of the
research findings.
As mentioned above, we found no examples among the 18 fieldwork
authorities of a specific written policy document or statement on
overpayments.
The majority of authorities did have some form of procedural instructions,
for example, in a separate overpayment manual or as part of a wider
Housing Benefit procedure manual.  Most of these were essentially
technical manuals, explaining the sequence of operations for processing
overpayments, usually through the authority’s computer system.  A few
procedure documents also included explanations of the legislative base
for the procedures and advice and guidance on making decisions in cases
which might require the exercise of judgment or discretion.  There were
also a few authorities in our fieldwork sample that operated without
specific overpayment instructions or manuals.  In these authorities, it was
explained that the primary legislation, statutory instruments and, most
importantly, DSS guidance circulars were sufficient for the staff to deal
with overpayment work.
Some management staff said that their manuals were not up to date and
either needed revision or were in the process of being revised.  As an
illustration of the diversity identified during fieldwork, one authority
was preparing a procedure manual for the first time, while another was
2.2  Structure of the chapter
2.3  ‘Policy’ documentation
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converting its procedures and guidance into a Windows-based, on-line
form for incorporation within its Housing Benefit software.
One of the reasons why written procedures and manuals appeared not to
be routinely amended and updated is that in practice they were not widely
consulted.  The task of maintaining them was therefore usually not a
priority.  Once procedures were learned and staff were used to carrying
out what were mostly routine operations on the computer system, then
the need to refer to procedural manuals or DSS circulars was much
reduced.  Most of the assessment staff we interviewed rarely felt it necessary
to consult any written sources to deal with even problem cases.  The
normal course of action was to consult fellow assessors or supervisory
staff.
Among the authorities in this study, we found wide variations in the
type of documentation used to support overpayment work.  However,
as explained above, a number of authorities were moving towards more
or improved documentation.  Two managers said they would welcome
a formal authority policy on overpayments, to set out the goals of policy
and the administrative arrangements for achieving them.  This, it was
suggested, would increase the clarity of what the authority was trying to
achieve and would convey the message to all staff that overpayments
were treated seriously by the authority.
Because we found no written policies, this section describes the
‘approaches’ to overpayment work as they were explained to us principally
by Housing Benefit managerial staff.  We do this in relation to classification,
recoverability and recovery.
The notion that a local authority might have a policy on the classification
of overpayments was not recognised by the Housing Benefit managers
we interviewed.  It was explained that classification of overpayments was
a statutory requirement governed by relatively clear and straightforward
guidelines.  Classification was a routine administrative task undertaken
by staff on assessment teams.  The ways in which classifications are carried
out and the issues that arise from that are analysed in Chapter 3.
We found no evidence to suggest that any local authority in our sample
had adopted a policy of deliberately misclassifying cases as fraud solely in
order to gain the higher rate of subsidy.
All Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit overpayments are
recoverable except for those caused by local authority error where the
claimant (or someone acting for them) or the person receiving the payment
(for example, a landlord) could not reasonably be expected to have known
that they were being overpaid.  The test of recoverability is therefore a
legal test and the decision to recover an overpayment caused by official
error should be supported by evidence to show that the recipient of the
2.4  The content of
overpayment ‘policies’
2.4.1  Classification
2.4.2  Recoverability
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benefit should have known they were receiving the wrong amount of
benefit.
In all cases of official error the local authority should apply the test of
recoverability before embarking on any recovery action.  For
overpayments caused by claimant error or fraud the full amount of the
overpayment is always recoverable in law.
We identified two distinct approaches among our fieldwork authorities
to making decisions regarding recoverability.  The first might be described
as the ‘correct’ approach, i.e. it was recognised that the test of recoverability
had to be applied in cases of official error and, where appropriate, recovery
should not be attempted.  Within this approach there were indications
that different standards were being applied in different authorities regarding
the interpretation of the ‘could reasonably be expected to know’ test.  In
some authorities the argument was put that Housing Benefit recipients
have the responsibility of knowing about their benefits and should in all
or most cases know when their payment is wrong and that therefore
recovery was justifiable in most cases.  In other authorities, the test of
recoverability was applied more rigorously, taking into account the amount
of the overpayment, the circumstances of the claimant and in some cases
the accounting systems of landlords (such as Housing Associations).  These
two positions represent the ends of a continuum rather than distinct
categories.  However, the interviews with Housing Benefit managers
suggest that there was more of a bias towards recovering overpayments
rather than defining them as non-recoverable.
The second approach (evident in only a small minority of the sample
authorities) was to deem all overpayments as recoverable without applying
the test of recoverability.  This ‘blanket policy’, the term used by one
Housing Benefit Manager, is essentially unlawful.  The authority’s decision
might be revised on appeal but the initial decision was always that the
overpayment was recoverable.
Unlike classification decisions and decisions about recoverability, decisions
about recovery are not based in legislation but are discretionary.  Even if
an overpayment is recoverable in law the local authority can decide not
to pursue recovery.
The dominant approach taken in the authorities visited, however, was to
pursue all recoverable overpayments in the first instance.  In the case of
some small overpayments where recovery would not be cost-effective,
an early decision not to recover might be taken.  Otherwise only in rare
circumstances would recovery not be sought at all.
R ecovery of overpayments from benefit recipients was described by the
Housing Benefit managers interviewed as largely a technical task rather
than a matter of policy.  There were a number of recovery methods
2.4.3  Recovery
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available to them in each case and the choice was usually automatic and
determined by the type of benefit involved.  Chapter 4 analyses fully the
recovery procedures and practices adopted by local authorities.
The choice of recovery method, the level of repayments, and the vigour
used to clear the overpayment were generally not influenced by the cause
of the overpayment.  In no authority was there a distinct policy of treating
fraudsters more harshly than other claimants.  Hence, in most cases, fraud
overpayments were treated no differently from other overpayments.
In contrast, there were differences in approach to the way in which
recovery from private sector landlords was sought.  As explained in Chapter
1, recovery can be sought from any party to whom the benefit is paid.
Hence local authorities have always had the ability to recover from
landlords paid direct by the authority.  Furthermore, this power has now
been extended by the provisions of the 1997 Fraud Act to allow local
authorities to recover overpayments from the benefit of other tenants of
a landlord.
The effectiveness of these recovery powers depends partly on a local
authority’s willingness to use them.  We identified two distinct attitudes
towards private sector landlords which appeared to influence different
authorities’ use of their recovery powers.  These attitudes are not
necessarily mutually exclusive although they can be thought of as
competitive in that one tends to dominate in any one authority.  The
first type of attitude was based on a view that landlords are business
people and should be treated as such.  Any overpayments that could
lawfully be recovered from them should therefore be pursued vigorously.
Sometimes linked to this view was the feeling that some landlords were
protected by the system of direct payments which allowed them to receive
rental payments without managing their properties to acceptable standards.
Authorities taking this position sometimes required new landlords to
sign an undertaking that, as a condition of receiving direct payment of
benefit, they would accept and meet demands for repayment of overpaid
benefit.
Contrasting with this business-oriented approach, was an approach that
viewed private sector landlords more as social partners providing a much
needed service that benefited not only the landlord, but also people on
low incomes requiring accommodation and the local authority itself whose
ability to provide rented housing was limited.  Hence there is advantage
in establishing co-operative relations with landlords which extends to
the treatment of overpayments.  So, for example, if an overpayment had
been caused by fraud, repayment would be sought from the claimant
because the landlord could not be expected to have any responsibility for
the overpayment even though the benefit was actually paid to them.
Effectively the local authority assumed responsibility for recovering the
debt and bore the financial consequences if recovery was not made.  It
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was an approach which put good relations with landlords above the need
to recover overpaid benefit.
There were no differences in approach to the classification and recovery
of rent rebate, rent allowance, and Council Tax Benefit overpayments.
In some authorities there were variations in practice which effectively
meant that private tenants were treated differently to council tenants (i.e.
the latter were subject to more lenient payment regimes) but it is not
possible from this research to attribute this to any conscious ‘policy’
decision.  Some BFI reports contain a similar observation.
Questions to Housing Benefit managers about the aims of overpayment
policy were difficult to pursue when the notion of ‘policy’ was somewhat
alien to them in the context of overpayments.  However, we were able
to explore the reasons behind the administrative arrangements for handling
overpayment work.
The main aim behind the arrangements for classifying overpayments was
to be able to complete the requirements of the subsidy claim form.  Each
overpayment had to be classified and procedures were in place to ensure
that this was done as accurately as possible.
The main purpose behind the more diffuse arrangements for recovering
overpayments (described in Chapter 4) was simply to recover as much as
possible by the simplest and cheapest means.  In the discussions with
managers, the potential for making money for the authority was only
mentioned in one authority.  (This authority had been subject to an
inspection by the BFI who make a consistent point in their reports that
authorities are failing to generate income through overpayment recovery.)
Common to discussions about classification and recovery were discourses
of good administration, and of cost minimisation.  Good administration was
referred to in terms of wanting to do the job of administering benefits
well and effectively, including complying with statutory requirements,
Council standing orders and departmental guidance, and ensuring subsidy
claims were completed fully and accurately.  Cost minimisation was
explained in terms of not using a disproportionate amount of administrative
resources on overpayment work.
As with the aims of policy, it is problematic to report on the influences
affecting the overpayment policies of local authorities when there is little
evidence that ‘policies’ exist in any formal sense.  However, it was possible
in the interviews with Housing Benefit managers to talk about the factors
that influenced the way in which they organised and carried out
overpayment work.  In particular it was possible to come to some firm
conclusions about the impact of (a) the subsidy arrangements for
reimbursing local authorities for overpaid benefit, including the recent
change to the subsidy for fraudulent overpayments, and (b) the incentive
2.4.4  Differences between rent
rebates, rent allowances, and
Council Tax Benefit
2.5  Aims underlying
overpayment ‘policy’
2.6  Influences on overpayment
‘policy’
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effect on local authorities of being able to retain 100 per cent of any
recovered overpayment.
As explained in Chapter 1, local authorities are reimbursed by the DSS
for 95 per cent of correctly paid benefit, 80 per cent of overpayments
caused by fraud, 25 per cent of overpayments due to claimant error and
zero per cent of overpayments caused by local authority error.  Until
April 1998 the subsidy in fraud overpayments was 95 per cent.
The clear message from the Housing Benefit managers we interviewed
was that the differential subsidy rates for overpayments had no effect on
the way in which overpayments were classified.  It was recognised that
mistakes in classification would always occur but there was no systematic
and deliberate misclassification in order to gain the higher subsidy attached
to fraud overpayments.  Nor was there any evidence of deliberate
misclassification of local authority errors as claimant errors in order to
obtain the 25 per cent subsidy rate.
In support of this assessment, managers cited the following:
• initial classification was often system-generated;
• the stringent definition of fraudulent cases associated with claiming
weekly benefit savings (WBS) ensured proper scrutiny of potential
fraud overpayments;
• classifications were checked and audited.
Managers were also clear that the reduction in the subsidy for fraud
overpayments from 95 per cent to 80 per cent had had no effect on any
aspect of overpayment work.
Local authorities have a financial incentive to recover overpayments
because they can retain in full any monies recovered.  Some managers
referred to the opportunity created by the regulations to make a profit
for their authority from the recovery of overpayments.  It was explained
that if an authority recovers more than 20 per cent of a fraud overpayment
it begins to make a profit, and can make up to 80 per cent of the value of
overpayment if it recovers in full.  For an overpayment caused by claimant
error the authority must recoup 75 per cent of the overpayment before it
is in profit, and for overpayments due to official error the authority can
only hope to break even if it recovers in full.  There is, at least theoretically,
a strong financial incentive for local authorities to pursue recovery
vigorously.
However, the evidence from the research is that this financial incentive
had virtually no effect on the approach to and methods adopted for the
recovery of overpayments.  On the face of it, this is a surprising and
counter-intuitive finding.  The evidence from the introduction of WBS
is that most authorities are very keen and quick to make the most of
2.6.1  The impact of subsidy
2.6.2  The impact of retaining
recovered overpayments
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opportunities for earning additional income.  Why this appears not to be
the case for overpayments needs careful examination.
The first observation to make is that the large majority of local authorities
did not collect consolidated information on the amount of overpayments
recovered.  The principal explanation for this was that since such
information was not required for subsidy purposes it was not collected.
It was not possible, therefore, for Housing Benefit managers or anyone
else in the authority to know how much income was being generated
through recovery procedures.  There was, therefore, no one in a local
authority who had a grasp of the amount of money that could potentially
be made for the authority and how much was actually made.  To echo a
comment made in several BFI reports, there was no evidence that there
was ownership of the overpayments issue.  We will return to this point
later in the report.
Although an authority stands to gain if overpayments are recovered, it
appeared that Housing Benefit managers did not have an incentive for
themselves and their departments.  In only one of the authorities visited
in this project were recovered overpayments paid back to the benefit
expenditure account.  And in none was the benefit administration budget
credited with recoveries.  For all the Housing Benefit managers in this
study therefore, overpayment recovery was an administrative expense
only.  Their task, as they saw it, was to balance the resources spent on
overpayment work (work which was integral to good administration)
against resources spent on processing claims and other administrative tasks.
It was apparent from our fieldwork visits that overpayments was growing
in importance as a policy issue in many authorities.  In contrast, there
were also authorities where overpayments did not appear to be of major
concern or interest.
Where it existed, much of the current interest had been generated by the
inspections and reports of the BFI.  Local authorities who had received a
visit were clearly aware of the BFI’s concerns around overpayments and
were usually actively engaged in responding to its recommendations.
Other authorities had, to varying degrees, taken note of report findings
and were at least reviewing their own procedures and practices.  The
reports of the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission were
read in relatively few authorities, and investigations by Parliamentary
Select Committees largely did not filter down to the level of the Housing
Benefit department.
The recent announcement by the Audit Commission that it will be
requiring local authorities to produce performance data on overpayment
2.6.3  The impact of Benefit Fraud
Inspectorate and other external
reports
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recovery from October 1999 was also alerting authorities to the need to
establish methods of calculating and reconciling overpayment recoveries.3
As mentioned in Chapter 1, three of the provisions of the 1997 Fraud
Act have a bearing on the overpayment work of local authorities:
• the extension of the powers to recover overpayments from landlords;
• the introduction of new civil court procedures;
• the introduction of administrative penalties for fraudsters.
We shall examine the implementation of these new measures in Chapter
5.  Some authorities had incorporated the measures into their overpayment
procedures and were using them to varying degrees, others were still at
the stage of considering how they might be operationalised.  However,
there were also authorities who had either chosen not to use one or
more of the new powers or who appeared to have taken little note of
them at all.  Some authorities had been motivated by the provisions of
the Act to begin drawing up prosecution policies which would include
the authority’s thinking about administrative penalties and civil court
procedures.  A few authorities also mentioned that audit reports of Housing
Benefit administration and the reports of the BFI had also been influential
in prompting them into action.
A further general finding of some importance is that the pursuit of
overpayments can potentially come into tension with other aims and
objectives of a Housing Benefit department or the local authority more
widely.  Managers in many authorities expressed the view that the quick
delivery of benefits was their primary objective.  This not only fitted
with their authority’s general ethos of service to the community but was
reinforced by government performance targets.  Housing Benefit managers
felt under strong pressure therefore to give a higher priority to benefit
processing than to overpayment recovery.
The pursuit of overpayments from people who are by definition likely to
be on a low income may also be influenced by an authority’s anti-poverty
strategy.  One manager speculated that the imminent adoption of such a
strategy in her authority would lead to the introduction of new, lower
levels of weekly repayments being sought from overpaid claimants.
Another reported that his authority’s anti-poverty stance had led the
Housing Benefit department to soften its otherwise tough approach to
recovering overpayments from claimants on Income Support by imposing
less onerous repayment regimes.
2.6.4  The impact of the provisions
of the 1997 Fraud Act
2.6.5  Influence of other local
authority policies
3 Since the research for this project was completed, the Department for the Environment,
Transport and the R egions has published a consultation document on performance
indicators and the Best Value initiative which suggests amendments to the Audit
Commission’s original ideas for assessing overpayment work (DETR , 1999).
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The implication of these findings is that any policy drive to increase the
levels of overpayment recovery must take into account the potential
tensions that this may cause for authorities with other policies, such as
explicit anti-poverty strategies, affecting the same group of claimants.
One of the main aims of this research project was to explore the policies
of local authorities in relation to overpayments.  The key findings from
the research are as follows:
• none of the authorities in the study had a formal written policy in
relation to overpayments;
• instead, local authorities had well-established structures and procedures
for carrying out overpayment work;
• the principal aims behind the administrative arrangements for
overpayment work were the pursuit of good administration and of
cost minimisation;
• the current subsidy and incentive measures did not affect local
authorities’ approaches to overpayment classification or recovery;
• discussions with managers revealed no evidence that they were pursuing
a policy of biasing classifications towards those generating higher levels
of subsidy;
• recovery of overpayments was viewed as a technical task rather than a
matter of policy;
• the dominant approach to recovery was to pursue all recoverable
overpayments in the first instance;
• there was not a consistent approach to the recovery of overpayments
from landlords;
• in some authorities the reports of the BFI had been influential in recent
thinking about overpayments work;
• some managers are having to manage a potential tension between
overpayment policy and other of their authority’s policies, such as
anti-poverty strategies.
It is clear that local authorities do not have distinct policies towards
overpayments in the sense of a formal statement of the principles and
objectives behind their administrative arrangements for dealing with
overpayments, and a strategy for achieving the authority’s objectives.
Authorities have clearly been carrying out overpayment work without
such documents for many years.  However, there is evidence that a
growing number of Housing Benefit managers (and possibly other local
authority officers) are recognising that the policy environment is changing,
that overpayments is increasing in importance as a policy issue and that
consequently there is a need for them to review their current procedures
and practices.  As mentioned earlier, some managers said they would
welcome a formal authority policy on overpayments, to clarify the goals
of policy and the administrative arrangements for achieving them.  There
is apparently a changing climate within some Housing Benefit departments
2.7  Summary and discussion
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that recognises that policy formulation on more and more aspects of
administration is likely to be an increasingly important element of their
work in the near future.
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CLASSIFICATION OF OVERPAYMENTS3
Local authorities must classify all overpayments by their cause in order to
comply with the requirements of the subsidy regulations.  The financial
implications of an incorrect classification can be substantial.  Overpayments
wrongly classified as local authority error will lose the authority subsidy
(a considerable amount if the overpayment is caused by fraud).
Overpayments wrongly classified as fraud will attract subsidy to which
the authority is not entitled.  Wrong classifications of claimant error may
lose or gain subsidy depending on the true cause of the overpayment.
Local authorities also have scope for manipulation in order to increase
their subsidy payments, for example by deliberately misclassifying
overpayments as claimant error or fraud.  There is also a perverse incentive
not to identify an overpayment in the first place in order to claim the
maximum 95 per cent subsidy that is paid on correct payments of benefit.
The recent report by the National Audit Office on Housing Benefit
fraud concluded that ‘... the current overpayment subsidy arrangements
are open to abuse’ (NAO, 1997, p.51) and that this pointed ‘... to a need
for reform or abolition of the system’ (p.51).
The importance of local authorities classifying overpayments correctly is
clear.  Hence in this research project we set out to provide a fuller
understanding of the procedures and practices used by authorities in
fulfilling their responsibility to classify the causes of Housing Benefit and
Council Tax Benefit overpayments.
The principal research questions that we addressed were as follows:
• Who is responsible for classifying overpayments?
• How do staff classify overpayments in practice?
• What influences their decisions?
• What information do local authorities collect on the classification of
overpayments?
The principal data used in this chapter are drawn from interviews with
Housing Benefit managers and with staff who played some hands-on
role in the classification of overpayments.
In order to put the interview data into context this chapter begins with a
description of the principal causes of overpayments and presents some
background statistical information based on government subsidy data for
1997/ 98 and on the National Housing Benefit Accuracy R eview for the
same year.  The next section describes how classifications are actually
carried out in local authorities.  This is followed by a summary of Benefit
3.1  Introduction
3.2  Structure of the chapter
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Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) assessments of standards of classification.  The
penultimate section briefly discusses the use of information on classification
by local authorities.  The main policy issues of the research findings are
drawn out in the final section.
Information about the amount of money lost to overpayments each year
is located in two sources.  First, annual local authority subsidy returns to
DSS record the value of overpayments and their causes for rent allowances
and Council Tax Benefit in England, Wales and Scotland, and for rent
rebates in Scotland only.  Secondly, the Department of the Environment,
Transport and the R egions (DETR ) and the National Assembly for Wales
hold subsidy data for English and Welsh authorities respectively in relation
to rent rebates only.  A complementary source of data is the National
Housing Benefit Accuracy R eview carried out for the year 1997/ 98
which used sampling techniques to estimate the extent of benefit losses
due to fraud and error (Government Statistical Service, 1998).
The subsidy data are not directly comparable with the Accuracy R eview
due to the different methods used to collect and analyse the data.  The
subsidy returns to DSS, DETR , and the Welsh Assembly include cases of
identified overpayments only.  In contrast, the Housing Benefit Accuracy
R eview identifies, from a large sample of cases, where fraud has been
confirmed or where there is a strong suspicion of fraud.  The Accuracy
R eview, therefore, gives an estimate of the total amount of benefit lost
to fraud. The subsidy data record the actual amounts of benefit overpaid
on those cases where an overpayment has been identified.
In this section we examine the results of an analysis of the local authority
subsidy data for 1997/ 98, and the accuracy review findings for the same
year.
An overpayment can be generated any time an ongoing claim is reassessed
and an existing payment is amended.  Overpayments are essentially a by-
product of a Housing Benefit department’s routine administration or
fraud investigation work.  As mentioned earlier, the principal causes of
overpayments are local authority error, claimant error or fraud.
A claimant error is essentially one of the following:
• the failure to report a relevant piece of information in relation to a
new or renewal claim;
• the provision of wrong information in relation to a new or renewal
claim;
• the late or wrong reporting of a relevant change in circumstances.
If the error comes to light at some point, perhaps when a claim is reviewed
or renewed or as the result of an investigation by fraud staff, an
overpayment of benefit is likely to be the result.  Overpayments attributed
to local authority error can be caused by the late processing of information
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as well as mistakes in, for example, inputting claim data or in making
award calculations.  Overpayments caused by fraud occur when claimants
deliberately misrepresent information given to a benefit authority or fail
to declare relevant changes in circumstances with the intent of obtaining
benefit to which they are not entitled.
An understanding of the distribution of overpayments by their cause is
important for informing thinking about the future direction of policy.
For the purposes of this research project, the DSS supplied the research
team with the returns from all authorities for the financial year 1997/ 98.
An analysis of the data is presented in Table 3.1.  It should be remembered
that the rent rebate data are for Scotland only.  R ent rebate data for
England and Wales are presented later in Table 3.2.
Table 3.1 Losses through overpayments compared with benefit expenditure, 1997/ 98, using
DSS subsidy data
Percentage of losses due to different causes
Claimant Total OP losses
Authority error (and Total OP expenditure as % of
error Fraud other causes) losses (£m) (£m) expenditure
Rent rebates1 7 9 84 19.6 736.5 2.7
Rent allowances2 9 24 67 220.6 5657.9 3.9
Council Tax Benefit2 8 15 77 82.7 2804.6 3.0
All benefits 9 21 71 322.6 9199.0 3.5
Source: Analysis of 1997/98 DSS subsidy returns from local authorities
1 Data are for Scottish local authorities only
2 Data are for all local authorities in Great Britain
Table 3.1 shows that across all three benefits the principal cause of identified
overpayments is claimant error rather than official error or fraud.  Overall
losses to fraud are only 21 per cent of all known overpayments, although
nearly a quarter of the losses on rent allowances are due to fraud.
Overpayments due to claimant errors most commonly arise, according
to the assessment staff interviewed for this project, when a claimant reports
a change in circumstances late or when new information comes to light
that reveals that the information originally provided by the claimant was
incomplete or wrong.  In both circumstances a re-assessment of the benefit
is carried out and the existence and value of any overpayment is identified.
Overpayments due to local authority error are mainly caused by late
processing of information.  This is not an uncommon experience in local
authorities.  Departments which run on tight staffing complements are
vulnerable at times of staff absence (through leave or sickness) and backlogs
of work can quickly accumulate.4  Computer problems or upgrades also
4 Taper et al. (1999) found that in 1998, 28 per cent of authorities in their telephone
survey reported current backlogs of rent allowance cases and 30 per cent reported
backlogs in rent rebate cases. Over 40 per cent of local authorities without a current
backlog reported that they had experienced a backlog at some point in the previous
year.
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reduce the ability of a department to process claims quickly.  Overpayments
caused by genuine mistakes by staff were thought to be comparatively
few.
Data supplied by DSS in relation to rent rebates in England and Wales
are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Losses through rent rebate overpayments for
England and Wales, 1997/ 98
Fraud overpayments
Total rent rebate Fraudulent  as % of all
overpayments overpayments overpayments
(£m) (£m) (£m)
England 111.6 20.8 19
Wales 5.9 0.9 15
England and Wales 117.5 21.7 18
Source: DETR and Welsh Assembly local authority subsidy returns
The data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 allow us to calculate that the aggregate
figure for all Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit expenditure lost
to identified overpayments in 1997/ 98 was £ 440.1 million (£ 322.6m
plus £ 117.5m).  Losses of £ 440 million represent a large potential loss of
public funds but a proportion of this amount will eventually be recovered
making the net loss lower (though as we shall see in Chapter 4, there are
no systematic data available to allow us to estimate how much is actually
recovered by local authorities).
From the local authority subsidy data, the apparent size of the overpayment
problem was over £ 440 million in 1997/ 98, of which £ 358 million was
in respect of Housing Benefit.  However, the National Housing Benefit
Accuracy R eview for the same year presents a different picture.  Its
conclusion was that the estimated annual cost to the taxpayer of incorrect
Housing Benefit payments (not including Council Tax Benefit
overpayments) was in the region of £ 840 million.  Furthermore, cases of
confirmed and suspected fraud accounted for the majority of this amount
(£ 610 million).  There appears to be a considerable discrepancy therefore
about the size of the overpayment problem between these two sources of
data.
Assuming that the Accuracy R eview methodology produces a reliable
estimate of benefit losses, there is a clear implication that local authorities
are not identifying the majority of overpayments that actually exist, with
the result that, in 1997/ 98 as much as £ 482 million (£ 840m minus
£ 358m) worth of Housing Benefit leaked out of the system with no
chance of being recovered.  This discrepancy in the measures of
overpayments suggests the need for further research and investigation
beyond the scope of this study.
3.3.3  National Housing Benefit
Accuracy Review findings
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, no local authority in our fieldwork sample
had an identifiable policy on the classification of overpayments.  It was
recognised that classification was a statutory requirement that was
operationalised as a routine administrative task to be undertaken mostly
by staff on assessment teams.
In all of the authorities visited, overpayment identification, calculation
and classification was to some degree an automated process triggered by
an assessment officer accessing a claimant’s computer record and amending
the data held on the system.  We were able to identify three models of
classification differentiated by the extent to which the process was
automated.
In the most automated systems, the classification of overpayments was
based on three key dates input by an assessor: the date of the relevant
change in the claimant’s circumstances, the date when the change or
new information was reported by the claimant to the authority, and the
date when the authority processed the information.  The system attributed
any overpayment between the first two of these dates to claimant error,
and between the second two dates to local authority error.  If at a later
date an overpayment was attributed to fraud, then these default settings
could be overridden manually and the correct classification entered.
In other authorities overpayments were identified and calculated when
new information was input to a claimant’s file, but there was a default
setting which classified the overpayment as due to claimant error in the
first instance.  Classifications of local authority error and fraud had to be
entered manually by overwriting the default classification of claimant
error.
In the final model, the system identified and calculated the overpayment
but required the assessor to input manually an overpayment classification
code.  There was no default setting.
The research design for this project does not allow us to make assessments
about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of these three models, but
it is possible to make some comments.  The most automated systems
appear to maximise the likelihood that overpayments will be correctly
attributed between claimant and local authority error.  The second two
models both rely on assessment staff to identify authority errors thus
introducing the risk that some authority errors are either not identified
or not entered onto the system.  It is possible that authorities with these
types of system have the highest rates of misclassifications between claimant
and official error.  However, at present there is no empirical data to
support or refute this hypothesis.
All three models rely on the manual input of a fraud classification code.
No one model is therefore more or less prone to overpayments being
wrongly classified as fraud.
3.4  How classifications are
carried out
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In our interviews with assessment staff, it was apparent that classifying
overpayments was not regarded as a problematic or even onerous part of
their activities.  There was certainly no evidence to suggest that staff
were deliberately misclassifying overpayments nor that they were under
any sort of management pressure to classify overpayments in any particular
way.  Most assessment staff were aware of the different rates of subsidy
for the main types of overpayment classification but said that they had no
relevance for the way in which they made classifications, especially since
for most of them the task was largely automated.
There was no evidence either that benefit staff were failing to identify
overpayments in order to claim the maximum amount of subsidy (95 per
cent) payable on correct claims. Indeed the way in which benefit
assessments are automated would make this very difficult to achieve even
if there was an intention to abuse the subsidy arrangements in such a
way.
Our scrutiny of the published reports of the BFI reveals a picture of
widely varying standards in the classification of overpayments by local
authorities.  However, the differences in the way in which BFI reports
on its examination of the accuracy in classifying overpayments make it
difficult to make direct comparisons between authorities.  It appears that
each BFI inspection has adopted slightly different methods of examination
and analysis in the authorities it has visited so far.  For example, the
numbers of cases examined varies considerably from below 20 to more
than 50.
R esults vary from correct classifications in 100 per cent of the cases
examined, to 12 out of 17 classifications being wrong.  The most common
fault, according to the reports, was for authorities to classify overpayments
as claimant error instead of local authority error.  There were also examples
of overpayments being classified as fraud rather than claimant or local
authority error.  Clearly some authorities inspected by BFI appeared to
have worryingly low standards of performance in relation to overpayment
classification.  However, the reports do not conclude that the classification
system is being abused in the way the report by the NAO suggests is
possible.
The computer systems used by local authorities for administering Housing
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit have the facility for producing analyses
of the causes of overpayments as required by the subsidy regulations.
Beyond this essential use, however, we found few attempts to use the
information on overpayments for management purposes.
In one authority which had a network of small locally-based offices
throughout its area, the Housing Benefit manager produced monthly
statistical reports on the number and type of overpayments generated in
each office.  This information was used to detect any unusual variation
3.5  BFI evaluations of
overpayment classifications
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which might warrant managerial investigation.  This was an isolated
example of the proactive use of overpayment information.
The main conclusions that can be drawn from our scrutiny of overpayment
classification by the local authorities in our sample are as follows:
• classification is largely a routine administrative task carried out by staff
on benefit assessment teams;
• classification is automated to varying degrees;
• all classifications of fraud overpayments must be entered manually onto
computer systems;
• there was no evidence of staff deliberately classifying overpayments
wrongly in order to increase subsidy payments obtained from central
government;
• there was no evidence that authority staff were failing to register
overpayments in order to increase subsidy payments;
• the size of the overpayment problem is unclear - the discrepancy
between losses calculated from local authority subsidy forms (£ 323
million for Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit) and the Accuracy
R eview estimate of losses (£ 840 million for Housing Benefit alone)
requires further investigation and research.
This research was not intended to produce data to allow an evaluation of
the accuracy of classification decisions.  The BFI carries out that function.
However, the published reports of the BFI do not yet provide a coherent
picture of either the overall performance of local authorities in classifying
overpayments nor a diagnosis of why some authorities appear to perform
badly compared with others.  We are left therefore with a number of
hypotheses that require further investigation, perhaps by the BFI in its
future inspections.  One hypothesis is that computer systems that default
to a classification of claimant error will tend to exaggerate the true level
of claimant error in comparison with local authority error.  A second
hypothesis is that systems which rely on a manual classification are more
prone to wrong classifications of claimant and authority error compared
with systems which apportion overpayments automatically using the key
dates relating to the change, when it is reported and when it is actioned.
Our interviews with Housing Benefit managers strongly suggest that the
different rates of subsidy paid on the different types of overpayment have
no bearing on the way in which Housing Benefit is administered.  For
example, the incentive to reduce local authority errors and so avoid a
zero rate of subsidy does not appear to motivate Housing Benefit managers
to reduce processing times.  That is not to say that managers are not
concerned to process claims quickly.  However, it does not appear that
the size of the authority’s Housing Benefit bill plays any part in their
thinking about how to organise their department’s activities.
3.7  Summary and discussion
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RECOVERABILITY AND RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENTS4
Once an overpayment has been identified, two decisions must be made
before recovery measures are put in place.  First, the local authority has a
statutory responsibility to decide whether an overpayment is recoverable
in law, and secondly the authority must exercise its discretion in deciding
whether or not to pursue recovery.
If an overpayment is recoverable and the local authority decides to pursue
recovery then the process of recovering the overpayment can begin.  As
mentioned in Chapter 1, the current government sees the recovery of
overpayments as serving a number of purposes within its wider counter-
fraud strategy.  R ecovery not only reduces the loss of public funds, but in
the case of fraud overpayments can act as a deterrent to potential fraudsters
by conveying the message that no financial gain can be made by social
security fraud.  The BFI has also emphasised this latter point in its published
reports.
Up until the last two years or so, little has been known about the policies,
procedures and practices of local authorities in relation to the recovery of
overpayments.  Even now, the DSS does not routinely and systematically
collect data from local authorities on the number and amount of
overpayments recovered.  While local authority subsidy returns to DSS
and DETR  show how much money leaks out of the benefit system
through identified overpayments of Housing Benefit and Council Tax
Benefit, there is currently no information on how much of this figure is
eventually recouped and how much is written off.  This is a serious gap
in our knowledge and adversely affects our ability to assess the efficiency
and effectiveness of local authorities’ attempts to recover overpaid benefit.
One of the main aims of this research, therefore, was to increase knowledge
about the recovery of Housing Benefit overpayments in order to inform
Departmental and local authority thinking about possible policy
developments.
The principal research questions that we addressed were as follows:
• Who decides whether an overpayment is recoverable?
• How are the relevant regulations (such as those relating to claimants’
knowledge of reporting responsibilities) interpreted and actioned?
• Who is responsible for recovering overpayments?
• How are decisions not to recover made?
• What methods of recovery are used?
• Who makes decisions about the recovery method to use in each case?
4.1  Introduction
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• What influences decisions about the method of recovery?
• What information do local authorities collect on the recovery of
overpayments?
• How successful are authorities in recovering overpayments?
• How are relations with claimants and landlords handled (including in
the event of an appeal)?
This chapter draws principally upon the interviews with local authority
staff in benefit departments and, where appropriate, in finance and legal
departments.
The chapter begins with a brief review of the extent of current knowledge
about the recovery of overpayments drawn from information contained
in the reports of the BFI, and a telephone survey conducted by MOR I
in late 1998 into Housing Benefit administrative practices (Taper et al.,
1999).  The next two sections explore how local authorities make decisions
about the recoverability of overpayments and whether or not to recover
an overpayment.  The following section explains the four principal means
by which local authorities attempt to recover overpayments: from ongoing
Housing Benefit payments, via a claimant’s rent or Council Tax account,
or by issuing a sundry debtor invoice.  The experience of pursuing recovery
from private sector landlords is also analysed.  The additional or alternative
means of attempting recovery, such as deductions from other social security
benefits, through the courts or through the use of debt collection agencies
are examined in the next section.  The next section describes the
experiences of local authorities in handling appeals against overpayment
decisions.  The penultimate section deals with a number of issues relating
to the recovery of overpayments that are relevant for thinking about the
future direction of policy, including the ‘ownership’ of recovery work,
measuring recovery performance and the link between recovery and the
deterrence of fraud.  The main policy issues of the research findings are
drawn out in the final section.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there is a serious gap in
our knowledge about how much overpaid Housing Benefit and Council
Tax Benefit is actually recovered by local authorities.
The evidence on recovery in the inspection reports of the BFI is patchy.
In some authorities inspectors were unable to collect any robust data on
recoveries.  In others the data were partial.  It was possible for example,
to calculate the amount of overpayments recovered through sundry debtor
accounts, but not the amounts recovered from rent or Council Tax
accounts.  This is not to say that repayments were not being made, rather
that the internal accounting and recording systems did not reconcile those
repayments with the original overpayment debt.  This problem is discussed
further in the following section.  Another limitation of the BFI reports is
that, understandably given the terms of reference of the Inspectorate,
4.2  Structure of the chapter
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they tend to concentrate on the recovery of fraud overpayments rather
than overpayments in general.
Nevertheless, in some inspection reports the BFI does cite a figure for
overpayment recovery.  These range from 15 per cent to 94 per cent.  In
other reports, more qualitative or partial assessments are given, such as
‘recovery is good’, ‘recovery through sundry debtors is good’ or ‘recovery
is presumed to be low’.  Some BFI reports also include assessments about
the priority given to overpayment recovery and the quality of an authority’s
recovery procedures.  There are criticisms of some authorities for giving
overpayments a low priority or for having poor procedures, and positive
comments where overpayment recovery is taken seriously and where
robust procedures are in place.
The overall impression from our examination of BFI reports is that many
authorities do not have the technical capacity to produce robust and
complete information about overpayment recoveries.  This impression is
confirmed by the results from a telephone survey of 247 local authorities
carried out in late 1998 (Taper et al., 1999).  Forty-nine per cent of the
Housing Benefit managers interviewed reported that their authority did
collect information on either the amount or the number of overpayments
recovered.5   In the survey, Housing Benefit managers were also asked, in
relation to rent rebates and rent allowances separately, if they prioritised
the recovery of any particular type of overpayment (multiple responses
were allowed).  Over two-thirds of the managers surveyed said that they
did not prioritise overpayment recoveries.  However, one in five managers
reported that they prioritised the recovery of fraud overpayments (for
rebates and allowances), compared with one in ten who prioritised claimant
error cases or overpayments with a high value.  These findings will be
compared later in the chapter with the findings from our interviews with
Housing Benefit staff about how overpayment recoveries are dealt with.
As mentioned in the previous chapter we identified two distinct practices
to making decisions regarding recoverability among the authorities in
the study: (a) the ‘correct’ practice where a test of recoverability was
routinely applied, as required by law, and (b) the application of a ‘blanket
policy’ where overpayments are deemed recoverable initially unless
changed later, for example following an appeal by the claimant. The use
of such blanket policies constitutes an illegal practice.
In the authorities adopting the correct practice, decisions about whether
an overpayment was recoverable were usually made in the first instance
by an assessment officer.  If the officer thought that the overpayment was
not recoverable because the claimant, or other recipient of the benefit,
4.4  R ecoverability
5 This figure of 49 per cent is difficult to interpret.  It is not possible to ascertain from
the survey findings, the proportion of these local authorities that collected information
on (a) the amount of overpayments only, (b) the number of overpayments only, or (c)
both the amount and the number.
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could not reasonably have known that they were being overpaid, then
the case was passed to a supervisory officer for confirmation and write-
off action.  In the two authorities in the sample where benefit
administration was contracted out, this confirmatory decision was taken
by a member of the client side, that is, a local authority official.
The general picture emerging from the interviews with assessment officers
was that making such decisions rarely caused them difficulties.  Deciding
whether a benefit recipient should have known they were being overpaid
was described as being ‘largely a matter of common sense’.  For example,
if a claimant had been wrongly awarded a higher pensioner premium
instead of the standard pensioner premium, or if a person on a sickness
benefit had been wrongly awarded a disability premium, the overpayment
was likely to be deemed non-recoverable.  In contrast, if a benefit official
made an error inputting income data, for example, and an incorrect
payment resulted, then the claimant would be expected to know that
they had been overpaid because income data appeared on the notification
letters sent to claimants.  Claimants were expected to look at these and
be able to identify and report to the authority when the benefit calculation
had been based on erroneous information.
In discussions with assessment officers about recoverability decisions, a
common thread appeared to be that claimants were expected to know
when information they had supplied themselves had not been used
correctly and about the fundamental parts of the Housing Benefit scheme
(such as the relevance of earnings or savings).  However, they were not
expected to have extensive knowledge of the full range of Housing Benefit
regulations, such as the rules around premiums.
In most of the authorities visited the outcome of applying these ‘common
sense’ responses to deciding recoverability appeared to be that the majority
of overpayments caused by local authority error were treated as
recoverable.  However, there is at present no readily available information
to confirm or contest this impression.  It is not clear the extent to which
Housing Benefit software systems have the capacity to produce information
reports about the number and value of ‘non-recoverable’ decisions.  There
is no research evidence to suggest that Housing Benefit managers viewed
such information as being particularly important or useful.  It is also
interesting to note that the reports of the BFI usually make no comment
or assessment about local authorities’ performance in relation to decisions
about recoverability.  Our scrutiny of the published reports produced
only one (critical) reference to the recoverability decisions made by a
local authority.
Closely linked to statutory decisions about the recoverability of
overpayments caused by local authority error are the discretionary decisions
of the local authority whether or not to pursue recovery. The next sections
present an analysis of decision making and administrative practice regarding
the recovery of overpayments.
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In the local authorities taking part in this study it was routine practice to
attempt full recovery of the vast majority of overpayments once the
decision had been taken that they were recoverable in law.  Only in a
small number of circumstances would a decision be taken not to attempt
recovery.  These decisions would normally be taken in the first instance
by assessment officers and passed to the appropriate supervisory or
managerial officer for ratification and write-off action.
For example, if a small overpayment had been identified (authority staff
cited values in the range between £ 5 and £ 25), the cost of recovery
might be thought to exceed the cost of recovery action.  In such
circumstances recovery might not be attempted.  Another example was
described in the following way: an overpayment might be caused by a
clearly identifiable error or series of errors on the part of a member of
staff, such as failing to enter income data correctly, the result being a
large cumulative overpayment.  Because the benefit calculation was set
out in the notification letter the claimant might reasonably have been
expected to identify the overpayment, but it was also reasonable that
they did not spot it (perhaps because of the size of the error, perhaps
because of the age or health of the claimant).  In such circumstances the
claimant could not be blamed for the overpayment and recovery might
be waived.  Such cases did not occur often, however, and the dominant
response in the authorities was, as mentioned above, to invoke recovery
procedures as soon as possible.
Local authority officials have a choice of methods for recovering overpaid
benefit.  However, in most cases the choice of method was automatic
and determined by the type of benefit overpaid and the current status of
the claimant.
Four methods of recovery accounted for the majority of recoveries:
• recovery from ongoing Housing Benefit payments;
• recovery from a council tenant’s rent account;
• recovery through a Council Tax account;
• issuing a sundry debtor invoice.
Each of these methods is discussed in turn.  Alternative methods of
recovery are discussed later in the chapter.
This method was most authorities’ first choice for private tenants still in
receipt of benefit.  Many authorities also made benefit deductions for
rent rebate cases (although recovery via the tenant’s rent account was
also common - see below).  Procedures were largely straightforward.
The claimant would be notified of the overpayment and in most cases
informed that deductions from ongoing benefit would be made from a
given date.  However, the rate of recovery is a discretionary decision for
the authority.  DSS guidance suggests that an appropriate rate of repayment
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for Income Support recipients is £ 7.80 per week for overpayments caused
by errors, and £ 10 per week for overpayments caused by fraud.  These
rates were widely used in the authorities visited in this study, but we also
identified a range of other practices:
• some authorities adopted their own standard rate of repayment for
Income Support cases, often at a lower rate than that suggested by the
DSS, for example £ 5 per week, but sometimes at a higher rate;
• some authorities attempted to recover at higher rates for rent allowance
cases where there was evidence (perhaps of savings) that a higher rate
would be affordable;
• some authorities had the aim of recovering the overpayment within a
fixed time period (for example, six months or a year) and divided the
overpayment into weekly amounts accordingly.
Whatever amount was initially set by the authority it was not uncommon
for the notification letter to trigger a response from the benefit recipient
usually in the form of a request to reduce the level of repayments.
Assessment officers then engaged in a negotiation with the claimant to
arrive at a mutually acceptable figure.  This might involve a detailed
examination of the income and outgoings of the claimant (one authority
used what it called ‘a means-tested form’ for this).
In discussions with Housing Benefit managers and assessment staff, it was
possible to identify three broad and distinctive styles of recovering
overpayments via ongoing benefit which were usually included in the
authority’s procedure manual for dealing with overpayments:
• the ‘tough’ style - here the aim of staff was to maximise the amount of
weekly repayments made by claimants. This might be attempted by
setting high initial rates of recovery or by negotiating hard when the
initial amount was challenged;
• the ‘utilitarian’ style - here the aim was to ensure that repayments
were maintained and that the overpayment was recovered in full
eventually rather than quickly. The thinking behind this approach was
that it is better to receive regular payments than risk a claimant defaulting
at some point in the future;
• the ‘holistic’ style - here there was more recognition that repayments
are often hard for people to make if they are on a low income. The
aim was still to recover the overpayment but not at the expense of
causing the claimant hardship.
These are not intended to present the picture that repayments from
ongoing benefit were handled rigidly in any particular authority.  Different
officers may change their style in individual cases, for example.  It was
not possible within the scope of this study to make any assessment of
whether any of these distinctive styles leads to relatively high or low rates
of recovery.
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R ecovering overpayments through ongoing benefit was generally seen
as a simple and effective method.  Once a regime of repayments had been
agreed, recovery was routine and required no further action by authority
staff.  It was thus seen as cheap and efficient.
A council tenant’s rent account offers a local authority an alternative
method of recovery to deducting repayments from ongoing benefit. For
the Housing Benefit department it is a quick and effective means of
recovery because it passes the responsibility for collecting repayments to
the authority’s Housing department.  However, a Housing department
can be faced with a number of problems, some of which are a product of
computer software packages.
We identified two main ways in which this method of recovery was
operationalised.  First, an overpayment of Housing Benefit was posted
directly to a council tenant’s rent account.  This usually resulted in the
debt appearing as an amount of arrears on the tenant’s account.  This was
generally unwelcome for a Housing department for whom one of their
key performance indicators was the level of rent arrears it was carrying.
Secondly, the overpayment was posted to the rent account but was not
subsumed within a tenant’s arrears.  The software allowed the overpayment
to be identified as a separate item on the account and be managed
separately.  Nevertheless, if the overpayment appeared in the rent account
the Housing department would employ its usual range of methods for
collection.
Similar to recovering overpayments from ongoing benefit, recovery via
a rent account is largely straightforward and cheap to administer.  However,
there are two issues that have a bearing on the development of
overpayment policy.  First, there is a problem of tracking repayments in
those authorities where an overpayment is simply added to a rent account
without appearing as a separate item on the account.  For example, a
tenant with an overpayment of £ 100 may already have rent arrears of,
say, £ 100.  When the new debt is posted to the account, the tenant will
now have arrears of £ 200.  As this debt is repaid there is no automatic
way of determining how much of the benefit overpayment has actually
been paid in comparison to the rent arrears.  Measuring the amount of
recovered overpayment achieved is therefore rendered problematic.
Secondly, when an overpayment is posted to a rent account, and
particularly if it is translated into an amount of rent arrears, many Housing
Benefit departments deem the overpayment of  Housing Benefit repaid
in full.  This is a perverse effect of internal financial management and
accounting arrangements and can distort the ‘true’ picture of the amount
of overpayments recovered.  It was explained to us by some managers
that it was not uncommon for an overpayment of rent rebate to be ‘cleared’
for the purposes of the Housing Benefit budget but for the debt to be
‘sitting’ in the tenant’s rent account for possibly years.
4.6.2  Recovery from a council
tenant’s rent account
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The recovery of overpaid Council Tax Benefit is largely straightforward.
When an overpayment has been identified, the debt is posted back to a
claimant’s Council Tax account and the collecting department will issue
a new bill for the amount of outstanding Council Tax payable plus the
overpayment.  The Council Tax department then pursues its usual
methods for securing payment by the end of the financial year.
While the procedures for overpaid Council Tax Benefit are simple, they
generate the same problem of tracking repayments as described above in
relation to rent rebates.  Also, all authorities deem Council Tax Benefit
overpayments repaid in full as soon as they are transferred to the Council
Tax account regardless of whether or not the debt is eventually cleared.
Each of the methods of recovery described so far is simple and cheap to
put in train.  However, they can only be used for people who remain on
benefit, remain council tenants or remain Council Tax payers.  For people
who are no longer benefit claimants or Council Tax payers, recovery is
usually attempted in the first instance by issuing a sundry debtor invoice.
The processes for issuing invoices are well-established and familiar.  In
most of the authorities in our sample, details of the overpayment were
passed to a section of the Finance Department responsible for issuing all
sundry debtor invoices on behalf of the authority.  This might be achieved
electronically where the authority’s computer system allowed or by
completing a standard form.  The details of the debt were entered on the
sundry debtor system from which bills were produced and despatched
automatically.  Systems all had trigger points at which reminders were
sent to debtors according to a prescribed timetable.  After a number of
reminder letters, debtors were sent warnings that civil court procedures
would be invoked if some form of settlement was not arranged.
It was standard practice for local authority invoices to request immediate
payment in full but to offer the debtor the opportunity to contact the
authority to discuss mutually acceptable repayment terms.  Most of the
staff interviewed in the course of this research reported that it was not
usual for bills to be settled either quickly or in full.  A common scenario
was that the authority did not have any contact with the debtor until the
letter threatening legal action.  This was often the impetus for the debtor
to begin negotiations about repayment terms.
When a debtor failed to respond to letters about legal action the case was
normally passed routinely to the authority’s legal department to make a
decision about recovering the debt through the courts.  Court action is
also a possibility in cases where people default on their repayments and
subsequent attempts to contact the debtor or re-arrange the repayment
schedule have failed.
4.6.3  Recovery through a Council
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In effect, when Housing Benefit overpayments are passed to sundry debtor
sections they become just another debt to the authority and are treated
no differently to, say, a charge for the use of an allotment or a bill for
hiring a room in the Town Hall.  The issues in securing payment are
therefore not particularly related to Housing Benefit but are generic to
all local authority debts.
Two main problems affect the likelihood of securing a full repayment of
debts.  We have discussed one already, the problem of non-payers and
defaulters, for whom court proceedings are the response.  The other
problem is locating the whereabouts of debtors in the first place.  This is
a common problem in relation to Housing Benefit overpayments because
tenant populations, especially in the private sector, tend to be more
transient than the population generally.
There are various means at the disposal of local authorities to track missing
debtors.  In the course of this research we identified a number of these
which were being used to varying degrees in the authorities we visited.
They can be divided into internal methods and external methods.  Internal
methods include searches of the computer records held by an authority,
such as the electoral roll, Council Tax records, and educational grants
records.  These searches enable the authority to locate people who are
still living within their boundaries.  The local Benefits Agency office can
also assist in locating locally-based claimants of other benefits, or the
local authority might conduct such a search themselves where they have
access to a R emote Access Terminal linking them to the Benefits Agency’s
computer records.  When no local trace of the person can be found by
these means, an authority might extend its search by using one of the
following methods:
• a request to the Benefits Agency to search its wider records, including
the Departmental Central Index;
• employing a tracing agency;
• buying in to one of the commercial computerised tracing systems.
From our fieldwork visits we would conclude that many and probably
most authorities are not well equipped to use external methods for tracing
missing debtors.
Local authorities have the power to recover overpayments from any person
or organisation, such as a Housing Association, to whom the benefit
payment was made.  This covers claimants, their appointees and landlords
paid direct by the authority.  R ecovery from landlords holds a number of
advantages for local authorities.  Landlords are not transient like many of
their tenants.  They can usually be traced easily.  They usually have
sufficient resources to make repayments of overpaid benefit.
4.6.5  Recovery from landlords
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The power to recover overpayments from landlords was used to varying
degrees in all the authorities visited in this study.  As we have already
described in Chapter 2, authorities vary considerably in their general
policy towards making deductions from landlords.  To recap, some viewed
landlords as they would any other commercial enterprise with which the
authority conducts business.  Hence, any overpayments that could lawfully
be recovered from landlords were pursued vigorously.  Some authorities
widened this business-like stance and required new landlords to sign an
undertaking, as a condition of receiving direct payment of benefit, to
agree to repay any overpaid benefit.  In contrast, other authorities tended
to treat landlords more as partners in the maintenance of the private
rented sector as a useful social resource.  As part of this approach, some
authorities worked to establish co-operative relations with landlords which
included the treatment of overpayments.  In some cases, a local authority
might assume responsibility for recovering an overpayment from a
claimant, although it was legally entitled to require the landlord to repay.
The use by local authorities of the recent extension of their powers to
recover from landlords, described in Chapter 1, is analysed in Chapter 5
which deals more widely with the impact of the changes in the 1997
Fraud Act relevant to overpayments.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the government and the BFI view
the recovery of overpayments as playing a key role in the deterrence of
Housing Benefit fraud.  Many of the BFI reports criticise local authorities
for not raising overpayments on cases where weekly benefit savings had
been claimed and for not recovering more of the overpaid benefit caused
by fraud.
In this research we explored with Housing Benefit managers and staff the
extent to which they treated the recovery of fraud overpayments differently
to other overpayments.  Where recovery was being made from ongoing
benefit, most of the authorities visited applied the higher rate (£ 10 per
week compared with £ 7.80) recommended in DSS guidance.  However,
apart from this example of differential treatment, we did not identify
other ways in which fraudsters were treated more robustly than other
claimants.
Some overpayment recovery staff explained that fraud overpayments were
often the most difficult to track down and had a lower probability of
being repaid.  For example, fraudsters often moved on precisely to avoid
detection, and while a fraud may have been identified and stopped, the
culprit may have moved before further recovery or investigation work
could be carried out.  Also, experience showed that determined fraudsters
were often likely to resist repayment even if eventually tracked down.
Overall, therefore, dealing with fraudulent overpayments represented a
source of additional work for the authority with an uncertain result.
4.6.6  Recovering overpayments
from fraudsters
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Hence, in most authorities we found that fraud overpayments were
pursued in the same way as other overpayments.  When they become
debts to the authority (i.e. an invoice was raised) they were also pursued
no differently and decisions about when to stop chasing the debt were
not influenced by the fact that the debt originally arose through fraud.
Methods of recovery were most often grounded in discussions about
administrative ease and efficiency.  Managers and staff wanted to achieve
recovery by the easiest and most effective means.  We found no examples
of any form of a moral or punitive stance being taken towards fraudsters.
These results are interesting when set alongside the survey results quoted
earlier that suggested one in five authorities prioritised the recovery of
fraud overpayments (Taper et al., 1999).  In a sense, local authorities in
the study reported here did prioritise recovery efforts by imposing higher
rates of weekly repayments on suspected fraudsters.  However, apart from
that distinction, fraudsters were treated no differently to other claimants
when repayment arrangements broke down.  At this stage, officers in
sundry debtor sections or in legal departments treated them in the same
way as they would treat any defaulter regardless of the original source of
the debt to the authority.
In the view of the Housing Benefit staff interviewed for this project, the
four principal means of seeking recovery of overpayments described in
the previous section probably accounted for the large majority of recovery
actions carried out in their local authorities.  Only rarely was it impossible
to use one of them.
However, there were other methods available to local authorities:
• recovery from social security benefits administered by the Benefits
Agency;
• recovery from Housing Benefit administered by another local authority;
• debt collection agencies;
• obtaining judgments in the civil courts.
Each method is discussed in turn.
Local authorities can request the Benefits Agency to recover a Housing
Benefit or Council Tax Benefit overpayment from payments of other
social security benefits.  However, the reports of the BFI consistently
contain the comment that local authorities rarely avail themselves of this
opportunity and thereby deprive themselves of recovering, and retaining,
overpaid benefit.  This picture is much the same in the 18 authorities
visited in this study.
In discussing this form of recovery with Housing Benefit managers and
staff we were able to divide authorities into three principal types defined
4.7  Alternative means of
recovering overpayments
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by their use of, and views about, recovery via the Benefits Agency:
• the ‘never-users’;
• the ‘disappointed users’;
• the ‘satisfied users’.
The never-users included those authorities which not only had never
attempted to recover an overpayment via the Benefits Agency, but seemed
to have little or no intention of trying in the future.  Some of the authorities
in this category had little confidence that the effort of recovering from
the Benefits Agency would be worthwhile or effective and chose not to
invest any time in establishing or investigating procedures for
implementation.  Some reported relatively poor relations with the local
Benefits Agency office.
The disappointed users tended to be those authorities where an attempt
or attempts had been made to recover an overpayment from the Agency,
but where the experience was not positive. Problems included the
following:
• too much work was required in liaising with the Agency;
• the Agency did not action the request in a reasonable time;
• the overpayment recovery could not be actioned because the claimant
already had other, higher priority, deductions from their benefit;
• repayments were too low or discontinued for some reason.
Disappointed users tended also to be non-users at the time of the fieldwork
interviews, put off from trying again because of their earlier negative
experiences.
The satisfied users were a small group.  They tended to be local authorities
who had established good working relations with the Benefits Agency
and who had proactively set up systems of communication and liaison to
facilitate joint working across all aspects of benefit administration not
only in relation to overpayments.
It might be expected that this rather unpromising picture will improve
in the future and that the number of satisfied users will increase.  There
are two reasons for this assessment.  First, the emphasis put on the potential
for this method of recovery in BFI reports is likely to encourage authorities
to use it, and secondly, the initiatives around closer working can be
expected to produce models of good practice that other authorities and
Benefits Agency offices could follow.
Local authorities can also request other authorities to recover overpayments
from their payments of Housing Benefit.  This method of recovery is
almost never used.  Only one Housing Benefit manager in our sample
said that their department was happy to provide this service for other
authorities.  In contrast, most managers were very reluctant to offer a
4.7.2  Recovery from Housing
Benefit administered by another
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service which (a) was not covered in the Housing Benefit administrative
subsidy paid by central government, and (b) would only add to their
own authority’s debt if the deductions were applied to council tenants.
Most managers saw only problems with this method of recovery rather
than recognising any potential for increasing their rates of recovery.
From our scrutiny of the published BFI reports and from our own research
it is apparent that the use of debt collection agencies to recover
overpayments is not widespread.  Their use was usually restricted to a
small number of cases either as an alternative to passing the case to the
legal section for further action when attempts at recovery through sundry
debtors had failed, or when attempts to trace the debtor had failed.  Debt
collection agencies are usually paid a percentage of the debt successfully
recovered.  Commission rates in the area of 15 to 20 per cent seemed to
be typical.  The advantage of using agencies were as follows:
• they were only paid if successful;
• the alternative was usually writing off the debt, so there was nothing
to lose;
• debt collection agencies were able to pursue recovery in any part of
the country.
One manager explained that the choice of agency was important.  It
would not reflect well on the authority if an agency employed strong
arm tactics to recover debts.  Generally, those authorities employing the
services of debt collectors saw them as a useful method, usually of last
resort, in a small number of appropriate cases, for example when the
overpayment was large and where the cause was fraud.
The final means by which a local authority can attempt to recover an
overpayment is by obtaining a civil court judgment against a claimant or
landlord.  Before the provisions of the 1997 Fraud Act came into force,
the procedures for obtaining a court judgment were fairly routine for a
local authority legal department although sometimes protracted if the
case was defended.
In all of the authorities visited, proceedings against debtors were regularly
taken when all other attempts at recovery had proved unsuccessful.
However, obtaining a judgment did not ensure recovery of the
overpayment.  From our interviews with Housing Benefit and legal
department staff it was not possible to assess or even estimate the proportion
of debts that were eventually recovered following court proceedings.
It is interesting to note that two of the criticisms made by some of the
staff interviewed should be addressed by two of the reforms introduced
by the 1997 Act, which are examined fully in the next chapter.  Some
staff were concerned about the amount of authority staff time that was
taken up with attending court for hearings and arbitration meetings.  The
4.7.3  Debt collection agencies
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new fast-track procedures for obtaining a court judgment are intended to
remove the need for most court hearings.  The second criticism was
directed mainly at those landlords who simply refused to repay
overpayments and forced the authority eventually to take them to court
to recover the debt.  The new powers to recover overpayments from
benefit payments for a landlord’s other tenants provide the opportunity
to pre-empt such action in future.
Claimants, landlords and others affected by a Housing Benefit decision
have a right to appeal against those aspects of the decision which have a
statutory basis.  Hence an appeal can be lodged against a decision by a
local authority as to whether an overpayment is recoverable in law, but
there is no right of appeal against the authority’s decision to recover the
overpayment because this is a discretion granted to the authority. Appeals
are decided initially by local authority officials (called the ‘internal review’
stage).  The claimant has a further right of appeal to a Housing Benefit
R eview Board which comprises at least three elected members of the
authority.
The local authorities in our sample reported very different experiences of
appeals against overpayment decisions.  In a few authorities it was reported
that there were very few overpayment appeals, while others dealt with a
regular flow of appeals of at least one per week.  In some authorities
overpayment appeals were the most common type of appeal on Housing
Benefit cases and took up most of the time of appeals staff.  Internal
reviews were handled either by specialist appeal teams, team leaders or a
member of the managerial staff.
Although the flow of appeals varied widely, it was reported consistently
that relatively few cases progressed beyond the internal review to be
heard by a R eview Board.  Some Housing Benefit staff interviewed
reported that in their authorities landlords were more likely than claimants
to pursue a case to a R eview Board, or indeed lodge an appeal in the first
place.  The view was expressed in a number of authorities that some
landlords appeared to pursue appeals as a means of delaying making
repayments.
R egardless of the level of appeals activity in an authority, we found no
examples of appeals having an impact on either the administration of
overpayments in particular or of benefits in general.  No authority kept
detailed information on the type or outcomes of appeals that might serve
as management information to inform the wider administration of Housing
Benefit.
In Chapter 2 we mentioned that one of the reasons for the lack of any
comprehensive data on overpayment recoveries was the lack of ownership
of the overpayment policy area.  The BFI has also suggested that lack of
ownership ‘compromises recovery efforts’ of local authorities.  This
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chapter’s examination of the procedures and practices around recovery
shows clearly why such ownership is missing at present.  Several local
authority departments play a number of diverse roles in relation to
overpayment recovery:
• Benefit departments arrange recovery from ongoing Housing Benefit
payments and may be involved in arranging recovery from other benefits
with the Benefits Agency.
• Housing departments take on the task of recovering rent rebate
overpayments when they are posted to a tenant’s rent account.
• Council Tax departments take on the task of recovering Council Tax
Benefit  overpayments when they are posted to a Council Tax payer’s
account.
• Finance department sundry debtor sections distribute and chase invoices
raised in respect of overpayments.
• Legal departments arrange for civil court judgments to be obtained against
overpayment debtors and for collection of the debt.
None of these departments has a direct overall responsibility for the
authority’s performance in recovering overpayments.  The administrative
arrangements can be characterised as ‘individual case management’ with
responsibility for each case passing from department to department as
appropriate but with no one retaining responsibility for all cases.
It cannot be concluded, however, that this complex set of arrangements
is necessarily inefficient.  That one authority inspected by the BFI can
achieve a recovery rate of 94 per cent suggests that a highly satisfactory
performance can be achieved.  However, it is also noteworthy that
managers interviewed for this research who had established dedicated
overpayments sections in their benefit departments tended to be the more
confident that all aspects of overpayment work, including recoveries,
were being handled effectively.
New Audit Commission performance indicators, introduced in respect
of the year 1999/ 2000, for overpayment work includes ‘the percentage
of recoverable overpayments (excluding Council Tax Benefit) that were
recovered in the year’.  For an authority to be able to produce an accurate
calculation of this figure, it will need to bring together data from Housing
Benefit records, Housing department rent accounts, and sundry debtor
systems.  As we have discussed in this chapter, this task will be difficult
for many authorities whose computer systems cannot readily produce
such information.  It is likely to be some time, therefore, before perhaps
even a majority of authorities can supply the Commission with reliable
data.
As mentioned earlier, the government and BFI both see the active pursuit
of overpayment recovery as having a deterrent effect on potential benefit
fraudsters.  To explore this notion further, we discussed the link between
4.9.2  Measuring recovery
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recovery and deterrence with the Housing Benefit managers in the study.
The general impression from these discussions was that overpayment
recovery was not, at present, seen as having a major part to play in any
strategy of deterrence.  There was acknowledgement that an individual
claimant might be deterred from attempting fraud if they were detected
and forced to make repayments and that the grapevine effect might also
persuade some other potential fraudsters not to make the attempt.
However, overpayment recovery was generally not perceived as an actual
or potential sanction.  Innocent claimants whose overpayment was caused
by their or the authority’s error were required to make repayments as
much as fraudsters.  Topics such as prosecutions, other sanctions and
publicity were more likely to occur in discussions about deterrence than
overpayment recovery.
The main conclusions that can be drawn from our scrutiny of overpayment
recovery by the local authorities in our sample are as follows:
• some authorities do not routinely make decisions about the
recoverability of overpayments caused by official error as they are
required to by law;
• when recoverability decisions are made the outcome is that most cases
are considered recoverable;
• recovery action is taken on nearly all recoverable overpayments;
• in most cases the method of recovery is an automatic choice determined
by the type of benefit overpaid and the current status of the claimant;
• although overpayments caused by fraud were not prioritised by local
authorities, fraudsters were often required to make higher weekly
repayments than other claimants;
• there is no evidence that in the authorities visited benefit or other
authority staff ignored or avoided their responsibility to seek recovery
of overpaid benefit;
• all authorities used a standard range of recovery methods - deduction
from ongoing benefit, posting to a rent or Council Tax account, and
sundry debtor invoices - which accounted for the majority of their
recovery actions;
• recovery from other social security benefits, from other local authorities
or through debt collection agencies was attempted to varying degrees
across different authorities - each of these methods had particular
problems associated with them;
• authorities varied in their approach to recovering overpayments from
landlords and hence in the extent to which they used their powers to
do so;
• overpayment recovery was not the responsibility of a single local
authority department or official - no individual or department had
ownership of overpayment and recovery work was usually distributed
between at least five local authority departments;
4.10  Summary and discussion
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• the extent to which other methods were used varied considerably
between the authorities visited - most authorities rarely, if at all, sought
repayment from other social security benefits administered by the
Benefits Agency, from other local authorities, or used debt collection
agencies;
• all authorities pursued recovery through the civil courts as a last resort
when other recovery attempts had not succeeded;
• local authorities had very varied experiences of handling appeals against
overpayment decisions, but appeals appeared to have little impact on
the administration of overpayments, or of benefits more widely.
Most managers reported that in their authorities there was no
straightforward means of knowing how well they were performing in
recovering overpayments.  The relevant data were either held on different
computer systems or not held at all.  This lack of comprehensive recovery
data is a hindrance to policy development.  At present there is no
information with which to benchmark existing performance levels, or to
construct performance targets.  There are also methodological issues to
address, such as how to treat overpayments that have been posted to a
rent or a Council Tax account.  Some managers were also concerned
that performance figures produced by different authorities (including those
now required by the Audit Commission) would not be comparable
because they would be calculated using different methods depending on
the availability and accessibility of the necessary data within each authority.
The Audit Commission’s performance indicator is likely therefore to
reflect only partially the performance of local authorities in recovering
overpayments.
There is an arguable case therefore for developing methods of collecting
and analysing comprehensive and systematic data on the recovery of
overpayments.  However, even without such comprehensive information,
there is evidence to suggest that some authorities perform well using the
existing (and expanding) range of recovery methods.  The task of
developing appropriate performance indicators could, therefore, be
undertaken in parallel with a programme of measures designed to
encourage local authorities to emulate the activities and achievements of
the better performing authorities.
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The Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 included a number
of measures relevant to overpayments.  These were:
• the extension of local authorities’ powers to recover overpayments
from landlords and others to whom payment is made (such as letting
agencies);
• the introduction of new civil court procedures to simplify and speed
up the process of obtaining a court judgment against debtors;
• the introduction of a system of administrative penalties for fraudulent
claimants.
The first two of these are primarily intended to improve the recovery of
overpayments from claimants and landlords.  The administrative penalty
does not directly affect recovery but is an addition to the sanctions that
local authorities can apply to fraudulent claimants.  It is a punishment but
also has potential as a deterrent.  Part of the terms of reference for this
study were to explore whether and how the new provisions have been
used by local authorities and to assess, in the view of authority staff, their
effectiveness.
The principal research questions that we set out to address were as follows:
• How frequently have the new provisions been used?
• Why have some authorities apparently not made use of their new
powers?
• How useful and effective have the new provisions been so far?
• How do local authorities view their use of the new powers in the
future?
Our analysis in this chapter draws on the interviews carried out with
local authority staff and on the published reports of the BFI.
Local authorities have always had the discretion to recover overpayments
directly from the benefit paid to a landlord in respect of a current tenant.
However, until recently, if the claimant ceased to be a tenant of the
landlord and an overpayment was outstanding, recovery could only be
sought by other means, such as a sundry debtor invoice.  Now, the 1997
Fraud Act has extended local authorities’ powers to recover overpayments
by allowing deductions from future payments to a landlord in respect of
his or her other tenants, regardless of whether the claimant is still a tenant.
The new powers came into effect in November 1997.
The new power increases the opportunities for authorities to recover
overpayments, serves a preventive function in stopping landlords gaining
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from the errors or fraudulent acts of others, and has a potential deterrent
effect on landlords.
The general picture to emerge from the interviews with Housing Benefit
managers and staff was that while there was a high level of awareness of
the extended power to recover overpayments from landlords, levels of
use were low, and some authorities had not yet recovered overpayments
in this way. There are a number of factors which explain this pattern of
activity.
The circumstances in which the new power is appropriate and applicable
are not common.  It is not surprising therefore that the power had been
used in only a small number of cases.  Furthermore, even when recovery
could theoretically be attempted by direct deduction, local authorities
still have the option of seeking recovery via a sundry debtor invoice.
Some Housing Benefit managers explained that in their authority, sending
an invoice was already an effective means of recovering overpayments.
The new power was therefore largely unnecessary.
Some authorities had experienced negative reactions from landlords when
they had applied the new provision.  Although it might be an effective
means of securing a recovery there was a price to be paid in potentially
harming existing relations with landlords.  Some Housing Benefit managers
had made efforts to keep landlords informed of the changes via information
leaflets and letters, or through existing networks of landlord forums.  They
reported that the new measure was generally unpopular with landlords.
In one example of good practice, however, a Housing Benefit manager
had taken time to reach an understanding with a local hostel that had a
highly transient population about the merits of the new provision, and
now routinely and unproblematically recovered overpayments in this
way.
One manager saw an indirect use of the new power as a bargaining tool
in negotiations with landlords who were in some way being obstructive
about repaying overpaid benefit.  It was thought likely that the threat of
imposing a deduction from other tenants’ payments could make landlords
more amenable to settling outstanding invoices.
In a number of the authorities visited, managers explained that their
own, or some large landlords’, computer systems acted as a barrier to
implementation (Housing Associations were most frequently mentioned).
Some systems apparently required substantial modification in order to be
able to action deductions from either aggregate cheques or the payments
to other tenants.
Overall, the new power was viewed by most managers we interviewed
as a useful addition to an authority’s capacity to recovery overpayments,
although some remained to be convinced of its usefulness.  However, at
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present it is not being used as a method of first choice even though it is
a guaranteed means of recovery.  Other considerations, some technical
and some related to maintaining good working relations with landlords,
tend to lead Housing Benefit staff to try alternative methods of recovery
in the first instance.
Since Housing Benefit was introduced in 1982, the recovery of
overpayments can be enforced by a local authority by obtaining a county
court order in England and Wales or a Sheriff Court order in Scotland.
As we have described in Chapter 4, for many authorities this is often a
long, drawn-out process which is time consuming for local authority
legal and benefit staff. However, the process for obtaining a court order
has been simplified considerably by the provisions of the 1997 Fraud
Act.
Local authorities now have the ability to use their own decision that a
Housing Benefit overpayment has occurred and is recoverable as proof
of debt in the civil courts.  In England and Wales, therefore, a Housing
Benefit determination can be registered as a judgment of the Court thus
allowing any of the Court enforcement procedures to be used for recovery
purposes (once the date for review has passed).  In Scotland, such a
determination is immediately enforceable by the usual methods of
diligence.
In practice, a local authority only has to complete and submit an
appropriate application to the court to obtain a judgment in their favour.
The need for local authority officers to attend court is removed.  The
cost of submitting an application is low compared with the cost of staff
time in preparing for and attending a court hearing.  At present, the fee
is £ 30.
In contrast to the high level of awareness of the new recovery powers in
relation to landlords, our interviews with Housing Benefit staff showed a
lower level of knowledge and understanding of the new civil court
procedures.  One authority had recently developed its own internal
procedures for preparing submissions to the courts including the
integration of the standard court application form into its computer system.
Its first applications had not yet been decided.  In another authority
difficulties were reported with the local court, whose officials did not
appear to be aware of the new procedures or have the requisite forms
available.  These teething difficulties had been overcome and several
cases were now being processed.
Some authorities were aware of the possible deterrent effect of the new
procedures.  Having a debt registered in the court has possibly serious
consequences for a person’s creditworthiness.  They might, for example,
find it difficult to obtain credit or a mortgage.  Warning a claimant of
these consequences and reminding them of the speed with which a
5.3  New civil court procedures
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judgment can be made was expected by some officers to prompt them
into settling the debt or arranging to pay by instalments.
The general picture to emerge from our fieldwork visits is that the new
civil court procedures are being implemented only very slowly.  In some
authorities there was little indication that much or any progress had been
made at all.  However, in those authorities where some progress had
been made towards using the new procedures, the overall opinion was
that they were potentially very useful for obtaining judgments in their
favour even though the task of actually securing repayments afterwards
still remained.
The 1997 Fraud Act introduced a system of administrative penalties for
claimants who have committed fraud.  Briefly, the new powers enable
local authorities to offer a claimant the alternative of paying a penalty of
30 per cent of the overpayment obtained by fraud as a way of avoiding
criminal prosecution.  The penalty is added to the amount that the claimant
owes the authority in overpaid benefit.  The intention is to introduce a
new sanction which will serve as both punishment to a fraudulent claimant
and as a deterrent to potential fraudsters.  (The new power can only be
invoked in respect of overpayments accrued after 15 December 1997.)
At the time the fieldwork was carried out for this research the
administrative penalty had been available to local authorities for
approximately 18 months.  However, we found very few examples of
the penalty being used.  Managers offered a range of explanations for
why it had not been applied in their authorities.  Many felt that, as presently
constituted, the administrative penalty had a very limited application.
For the offer of a penalty to be appropriate in a particular case there
should be sufficient evidence to support criminal proceedings.  Authorities
usually only begin to consider possible prosecution on serious cases of
fraud involving large sums of money.  Frauds involving small amounts
would very rarely be considered for prosecution and therefore would
not come within scope of the administrative penalty provisions.  In a
small number of authorities visited, it was explained that prosecutions
were either not made at all or only on rare occasions.  It was not possible
to trace the root of this stance towards prosecution which was described
more in terms of accepted custom and practice rather than by reference
to any specific policy source.  However, if cases are not developed for
possible prosecution then an authority effectively denies itself the
opportunity of invoking the administrative penalty.
Most managers felt that by the time a case had been investigated to the
point where a prosecution was sustainable (i.e. the supporting evidence
was sufficiently robust) then prosecution would be the preferred course
of action.  This feeling has been strengthened by recent government
pressure to increase the number of prosecutions undertaken by local
authorities.  Many authorities had developed, or were in the course of
5.4  Administrative penalties
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developing, prosecution policies.  Some managers interviewed mentioned
that their authority’s policy was likely to cover the use of administrative
penalties.  Many managers saw little point in adding a penalty to an
already high overpayment.  It was felt that the chances of recovering the
full amount of the new debt to the authority would only be reduced.
The overall reaction to the introduction of administrative penalties was
that they were generally misconceived and consequently of very limited
use.  However, one manager did consider that a penalty might be
appropriate for dealing with a limited type of landlord fraud, first because
landlords generally had the ability to pay and, secondly because the
imposition of the penalty might have a deterrent effect.
In designing this research project we were aware of the Department’s
need for as much information as possible on the use of the new provisions
in the 1997 Fraud Act which at the time of fieldwork had been in force
for around 18 months.
Our main findings are as follows:
• the new powers in relation to recovery from landlords were being
used in appropriate cases occasionally by some authorities and not at
all in others - they were viewed mainly positively as a useful addition
to a local authority’s ability to recover overpayments;
• the new civil court procedures were only just beginning to be used in
a few authorities, where they were viewed positively as a welcome
replacement for the previous costly and time-consuming procedure:
awareness and knowledge of the new powers, however, were not
high;
• the new system of administrative penalties had been used on only a
few occasions - its use was seen as very limited.
The evidence from our work in the 18 authorities visited is, therefore,
that the implementation and use of the new powers has been both slow
and patchy.  This finding partly reflects the variety in individual authorities’
reaction times in responding to new opportunities and responsibilities,
and partly the time needed to decide policy, design procedures, amend
computer systems, train staff and liaise with appropriate outside
organisations.  Lead times for implementing change can therefore be
considerable.  In the case of administrative penalties, however, the principal
reason why so few penalties had been imposed was the perceived (lack
of) usefulness of the provision.
It must also be remembered that implementing change carries a cost to
an authority.  This cost will often fall disproportionately on smaller
authorities with small complements of staff and small administrative
budgets.  The time needed to learn about new provisions, and plan and
implement the necessary changes, will often present smaller authorities
with considerable logistic problems.  Taking one member of staff away
5.5  Summary and discussion
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from a staff of, say, 15 to carry out the requisite work in, for example,
setting up administrative systems to enable the administrative penalty to
be used, will have greater repercussions than in an authority with a staff
complement of over 100 that included a training and development officer.
From the perspective of the external researcher, it is not surprising to
find new discretionary powers not acted on quickly or indeed acted on at
all.
It is clear that the new powers of recovery discussed in this chapter increase
the range of recovery methods available to a local authority.  However,
they are only ever likely to be applicable in a relatively small proportion
of overpayment cases when other, simpler methods of recovery have not
been successful.  Without any major external stimulus it is likely that
those local authorities that have begun to use the powers will increase
their use in the future, and other authorities will gradually be added to
their number.  The question for policy makers is whether this is a
satisfactory state of affairs or whether some other action is needed to
encourage local authorities to use their discretionary powers more.
The policy questions regarding administrative penalties are different.  If
the principle of penalties is still perceived as a useful counter-fraud tool
then some thought needs to be given to extending their applicability to
cases where, in policy terms, such a response is deemed appropriate.
There also appears to be a case, however, for reconsidering whether
some alternative to administrative penalties is either desirable, feasible or
even necessary.
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Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit overpayments have become
an important policy issue in recent years.  The fraud strategy paper
Safeguarding Social Security, sets out the government’s objectives to reduce
programme loss by improving the recovery of overpayments (DSS, 1999,
Chapter 4).
This study set out to improve the DSS’s knowledge and understanding
of the policies and procedures of local authorities in relation to the
classification and recovery of overpayments.  The analysis presented in
this report is based principally on interviews with 82 benefit, financial
and legal staff in 18 local authorities in Great Britain, and on an examination
of the published reports of the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (BFI).  The
main findings regarding the current policies and practices surrounding
overpayments have been presented at the end of each preceding chapter.
This chapter presents, analyses and discusses the views of Housing Benefit
and other local authority staff about how improvements in overpayment
work could be attempted.  These include the problem of the ownership
of overpayment work, the role of subsidies and incentives in relation to
overpayments, the measurement of overpayment performance, the link
between overpayments and the deterrence of fraud, how the prevention
and recovery of overpayments could be improved, and the roles of
organisations outside local government, such as the DSS and BFI.
Overpayments are identified through the routine administration of benefits
and the discovery of fraudulent claims.  They are the result of the
interaction between the substantive rules of the Housing Benefit and
Council Tax Benefit schemes, the procedures and practices of local
authorities, the actions of claimants and landlords, and the actions of
relevant third parties such as the Benefits Agency.  The cause of any
individual overpayment can be traced to one or more of these sources.
In developing future policy, therefore, DSS should be aware that options
lie not only in improving local authorities’ performance in relation to
overpayments but also in possible changes to the benefit schemes
themselves and in the behaviour and actions of claimants, landlords and
other third parties.
We will use the following two aims as benchmarks in assessing the policy
options discussed later in the chapter:
• a reduction in the number of overpayments, especially those caused
by fraud;
• an increase in the amount of overpaid benefit that is recovered.
CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT6
6.1  Introduction
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In this section we present the key issues that have been identified in the
course of the research and discuss their possible implications for policy
development.  All of the policy ideas were discussed with some, if not all,
of the respondents interviewed.  Many emerged as their own suggestions,
others were prompted by the reports of the BFI, whilst some were
formulated by the research team from their reflections on the interviews
and analysis of the data.
The evidence from this research project clearly shows that overpayment
work is fragmented among a number of different local authority
departments.  While Housing Benefit managers were able to put forward
many practical reasons for dividing aspects of overpayment administration
between departments, there was also an acknowledgement that this did
not create the best environment for developing overpayment work
systematically and coherently.
The BFI has also dealt with this issue in many of its local authority reports
and makes the recommendation for some that bringing responsibility for
overpayment administration under a single management command would
bring improvements in performance.  Some authorities in this study did
organise overpayments work in ways that approached the model of a
single management command.
Establishing a single management command would serve the purpose of
creating ownership and thus a clear responsibility for all overpayment
work.  A single officer would then be held accountable for levels of
performance in relation to the classification and recovery of overpayments.
In discussions with Housing Benefit managers it was recognised that this
proposal would be beneficial.  However, for some local authorities it was
suggested that there could be considerable administrative and managerial
obstacles to overcome if single ownership of overpayments was to become
a reality.  Some traditional divisions of labour (for example, between
benefit administration, income collection, and legal services) would have
to be addressed.  Nevertheless, it was concluded that there would be
some merit in the DSS exploring this option in more detail with local
authorities and their organisations.
One of the most striking findings from the fieldwork was the almost total
absence of any influence on those interviewed of the incentives
theoretically contained in the DSS subsidy provisions for reimbursing
overpaid benefit, and the rewards available to local authorities who recover
overpayments.  This finding raises a number of questions:
• Are financial incentives and subsidies the right policy instruments for
encouraging local authorities to reduce the number of overpayments
and to increase the amount of overpaid benefit recovered?
• Are subsidies ineffective because they are not set at the right levels?
Would changes in the levels restore the effectiveness of subsidies?
6.2  Key policy issues
6.2.1  The ownership of
overpayment work
6.2.2  Subsidies and incentives
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• Would the financial incentives be more effective if there was ownership
of overpayment work in local authorities?
Financial incentives are generally assumed to provide sufficient motivation
for local authorities to achieve objectives set by central government.  The
system of weekly benefit savings (WBS) which rewards authorities for
identifying and stopping fraud has certainly increased the amount of
counter-fraud activity in most authorities, although the claims made by
some authorities for the savings achieved have been called into question
by the National Audit Office (NAO, 1997).  If the overpayment incentives
are currently ineffective then the question arises of what should replace
them.  A number of possible policy options emerged in the course of the
interviews with Housing Benefit managers and staff and were explored
with them.  One option that generated considerable discussion was the
use of performance measurement as the basis for motivating local
authorities to reduce overpayments and increase recoveries.  This idea is
explored fully in the next section.  Other possibilities raised in discussions
included financial penalties for local authorities performing poorly,
changing the rates of overpayment subsidies, and channelling recovered
monies back to Housing Benefit departments.
An observation made by a number of Housing Benefit staff interviewed
was that financial penalties were often an effective means of getting local
authorities to change their practices.  A penalty in the form of a clearly
identifiable financial loss was likely to attract the attention of senior officers
and elected members alike.6  Once a policy area attracted this level of
interest then, it was suggested, it would be more likely that the necessary
resources would be found to prevent such loss in the future.
The current subsidies for overpaid benefit range from 80 per cent (for
fraud) to zero (for local authority errors) without there being any
discernible effect on local authorities’ efforts to reduce the incidence of
overpayments.  Theoretically, a radical reduction in these levels, to perhaps
zero subsidy on all overpayments, could be expected to encourage
authorities to reduce overpayments in order to minimise their losses.
Alternatively, if the subsidy was high across the board, say 90 per cent,
then there would be a greater incentive for authorities to recover
overpayments because they would be quickly be able to generate net
income.  Both these ideas were raised in discussions with some Housing
Benefit managers but no conclusive view emerged.
One of the reasons why the current financial incentives appear to be
ineffective is that no single department in the authority reaps the rewards
6 The weekly benefit savings scheme includes such a penalty. An authority which fails
to achieve 75 per cent of its annual savings threshold is subject to a pound for pound
penalty for every pound it falls short of the threshold.
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from recovering overpayments or suffers any adverse consequences if the
incidence of overpayments is high in the first place.  Establishing ownership
of overpayments work would create the opportunity of linking the current
incentive arrangements to performance.
The effectiveness of the existing financial incentives might also be increased
if senior officials (such as Chief Executives and Finance Directors) and
the elected members of the council were more aware of the possibilities
that overpayment recovery presented for generating income for the
authority.  A campaign to raise awareness of overpayment issues might
therefore be a viable policy option.
Information on the incidence, value and causes of overpayments is already
collected by local authorities.  In stark contrast is the lack of any systematic
information on overpayment recovery.  The evidence from this research
suggests that many authorities are not well placed to collect recovery data
in the short term and that this will affect their ability to provide the Audit
Commission with performance data by the end of the year 1999/ 2000.
Although they may change after the consultation by the DETR  on Best
Value performance measurement, the Audit Commission’s three published
indicators are currently defined as follows:
• the amount of benefit overpaid as a percentage of total benefits paid in
the year 1999/ 2000;
• the percentage of recoverable overpayments (excluding Council Tax)
that were recovered in the year;
• the number of overpayment cases identified in the year per 1000
claimants.
The first and third of these indicators can already be calculated from the
data collected by local authorities for subsidy purposes.  The recovery
indicator is an innovation that has its attractions.  A single, simple
performance indicator on overpayment recovery is easy to understand
and provides a simple means of comparing the performances of different
authorities.  However, a single indicator for a diffuse activity such as the
recovery of overpayments has limitations.  A similar argument has been
put forward by the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate in relation to the
measurement of counter-fraud activity by benefit authorities (BFI, 1998).
Their conclusion that a ‘scorecard’ of indicators is an appropriate response
to measuring a complex phenomenon has prompted us to reflect on how
overpayment work might be measured effectively.
All performance indicators essentially serve two purposes.  The first is to
provide an assessment of performance that can be compared with some
external standard and with other similar organisations.  The second is to
act as management information to alert managers to the need for
investigation or intervention.  Our analysis of the diffuse recovery
6.2.3  Performance measurement
on overpayment recovery
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operations of local authorities might suggest that the single performance
measure required by the Audit Commission is too simplistic or one-
dimensional and fails to reflect the different issues involved in pursuing
overpayments from, for example, rent rebate and rent allowance recipients,
or in respect of overpayments caused by fraud, claimant error or official
error.
There might be a case therefore for developing a ‘balanced scorecard’ of
indicators to generate data that would allow the Audit Commission and
others to assess the acceptability of an authority’s performance but also
provide a range of management information that authorities could use to
plan and develop strategies for improving performance in all areas of
overpayment recovery.
A more comprehensive and complementary set of indicators would allow
a more balanced assessment of an authority’s performance and provide
authority managers with information that they can use to monitor recovery
performance in detail.  It would appear worthwhile therefore considering
the pros and cons of a scorecard of indicators which could include the
following:
• percentage of recoverable overpayments that were recovered in the
year, broken down by:
- type of benefit;
- cause of overpayment;
- method of recovery;
• number and value of overpayments written-off;
• number and percentage of defaulted payments.
In developing measures, notice would need to be taken of the way in
which rent rebate and Council Tax Benefit overpayments are accounted
for in some authorities.  The current practice of treating benefit
overpayments as cleared once they are posted to rent or Council Tax
accounts clearly distorts the true picture of the amount of recoveries
actually achieved.
The development of a set of performance indicators for overpayment
work would fill an important gap in knowledge.  Policy thinking about
multiple performance indicators would need to take account of the cost
of data collection, but without some form of systematic information it is
not possible to benchmark current performance or evaluate the effect of
policy changes that might be introduced to improve recovery performance.
As we have mentioned at various points in this report, the government
views the recovery of overpayments as providing a useful deterrent to
the potential fraudster.  The thinking is that if fraudsters make no financial
gain from their fraudulent acts then they will be persuaded not to try
again in the future.  The BFI reports carry the same conviction.  In each
6.2.4  Overpayments and
deterrence
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of its reports it prefaces its analysis of recovering overpayments from
fraudsters with the message to the local authority that recovery is a
deterrent.
However, there is little evidence that recovery does, in practice, act as
much of a deterrent.  For example, a study of the role of penalties and
social security fraud (R owlingson et al., 1997) found that few of the
claimants interviewed ‘... considered that making people repay the amount
of benefit they had obtained fraudulently was an effective deterrent to
benefit fraud’ (p.96).  Most of the Housing Benefit staff interviewed in
this study held the same opinion.  In relation to both claimants and
landlords, the view was expressed by some that even if full recovery was
eventually achieved the culprit had in effect enjoyed an interest-free loan
and so had still obtained some advantage from their fraudulent act.
There was a general view that being detected was the best deterrent for
someone who had committed fraud and that publicity surrounding
detection and subsequent punishments could contribute to deterring
potential fraudsters.  However, some officers said that in their areas it was
difficult to attract much local publicity even for convictions obtained in
the criminal courts.  No one thought it remotely likely that they would
be able to generate publicity for successes in recovering overpayments.
The government and the BFI suggest that overpayment recovery is a
deterrent to potential fraudsters.  Pursuing a strategy of deterrence is
clearly an essential part of a wider counter-fraud strategy but the evidence
from this research suggests that recovering overpayments can contribute
in only a minor way at best.
There was a widespread view among the staff we interviewed that many
overpayments were preventable.  Many referred to the expected
improvement in the quality of decisions that should flow from the
implementation of the Housing Benefit Verification Framework.  Other
ideas for reducing overpayments suggested by Housing Benefit staff in
the study included the following:
• more resources for Housing Benefit departments to enable them to
process cases more quickly;
• better education of claimants and landlords so that changes in
circumstances were reported timeously;
• a better service from the Benefits Agency and the Employment Service
in notifying them of changes to claimants’ other benefits;
• more frequent reviews of claims in payment so that changes in
circumstances could be identified more quickly;
• shorter award periods so that overpayments did not continue for long
periods of time.
6.2.5  The prevention of
overpayments
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Clearly many of these measures would increase the administration costs
of Housing Benefit departments, the evaluation of which is outside the
scope of this study.
The prevention of overpayments could also be achieved, in the view of
some respondents, by changing the benefit structure itself.  Many
overpayments were felt to be the result of a highly complex benefit that
was almost incomprehensible to many recipients.  The key to reducing
the incidence of overpayments was seen to lie in the simplification of the
substantive rules of Housing Benefit and the rules for reporting changes
in circumstances.
At present most payments of Housing Benefit are made in arrears, typically
two weeks for claimants or four weeks for some of the bigger or corporate
landlords.  This effectively gives claimants and local authorities a period
of grace during which the late reporting of a change in circumstances or
the slightly delayed processing of a change does not generate an
overpayment.  If the period of arrears was increased then even more
overpayments would be prevented.  While this idea carries risks for tenants
and could be expected to be unpopular with landlords, the argument was
put that the transition from payment in advance to payment in arrears
had been managed effectively and that it could be anticipated that landlords
would eventually come to accept and accommodate any new time periods
into their financial practices.
For many years there has been a wide range of methods available to local
authorities to enable them to recover overpayments.  As described in
Chapter 5, these were enhanced in 1997 by the provisions of the Fraud
Act.  In our discussions with local authority staff the general feeling was
that there was no compelling need for any further powers.
One suggestion that was made however, was for Housing Benefit staff to
have the capacity to make deductions for overpayments directly from the
benefits administered by the Benefits Agency.  The recent introduction
of R emote Access Terminals which allowed local authority staff to
interrogate the computer records of local Benefits Agency offices suggested
that this could be technically feasible.  This is an interesting idea given
the BFI’s conviction that many local authorities are not availing themselves
of the power to recover overpayments from other social security benefits.
Not unexpectedly, many Housing Benefit managers suggested that more
overpayment recovery work would be possible if they received an increase
in their administrative budgets.  Without such an increase they were
faced with a dilemma: putting more resources into overpayment recovery
was desirable, but the cost of administration would rise as a result.  From
a manager’s viewpoint, this outcome is not desirable.  One of the issues
for Housing Benefit managers in dealing with overpayments is that if
they want to attempt to increase their recovery of overpayments they
6.2.6  The recovery of
overpayments
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must find the resources from within their existing administrative budgets
to do so.  They do not have access to any additional source of funds
comparable to Challenge Funding that was set up to enable authorities to
increase their counter-fraud work, nor do they gain any direct return
from the recovery of overpayments.
However, the experience of funding additional fraud work clearly provides
models that could be adapted in relation to overpayment work.  Something
like a Challenge Fund is possible, although there are problems with this
method of funding.  Challenge Funds, by definition, are limited and
subject to open competition.  It is arguably not a very effective means for
encouraging less well performing authorities to greater efforts and
performance.
Allowing Housing Benefit departments to retain some or all of the
recovered overpayments was another possibility discussed with Housing
Benefit managers.  However, this option is already available to local
authorities, although it is rarely put into practice.  The point was made
that if the DSS wished to develop a policy to ensure that Housing Benefit
departments benefited financially from its recovery of overpayments, it
might have to deal with potential opposition from local authorities and
their associations wishing to preserve local authorities’ autonomy in how
they use their income.
Housing Benefit is administered by local authorities on behalf of central
government.  Hence it is axiomatic that any objectives that the government
has in relation to Housing Benefit can only be achieved through the
agency of local authorities.  At present, the government is responsible for
the legislative substance of the benefit and provides the financial and
regulatory frameworks within which authorities can design and implement
administrative systems that are appropriate for them.  The DSS aims to
assist local authorities principally by issuing guidance circulars backed up
by the provision of advice for individual authorities on request.
Local authority performance is monitored through the provision of routine
and ad hoc administrative and financial information, and by external bodies
such as the Audit Commission, National Audit Office and, since 1997,
the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate.
R esearch evidence, and anecdotal evidence, suggests that local authorities
vary to an enormous degree in their responsiveness to new responsibilities
placed upon them and in their use of discretionary powers (see, for
example, Sainsbury, 1999a and 1999b).  We have discussed earlier in this
report some of the reasons for these variations (such as the perceived
utility of new powers, and the problems for some authorities in investing
the resources needed for implementation).
6.2.7  The DSS and the BFI
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One reflection of the research team is that the DSS should perhaps consider
ways in which its mainly passive role in policy implementation (issuing
guidance and responding to requests for advice) could be made more
active.7  The Department could provide more direct education for
authorities, either in groups (using conferences, briefings, or roadshows,
for example) or individually by spending time with authorities advising
them on implementation.  The scope of this individual help could range
from short consultancies to more hands-on assistance in, for example,
designing the infrastructure of administrative and financial systems needed
to effect implementation.  Some managers suggested that this kind of
direct help would possibly be attractive to their authorities.
There may be opportunities also for building on the influence that the
BFI is increasingly having on local authority benefit administration.
Though not discussed with respondents in this study, one possibility is
that the BFI could take on the roles described above in relation to the
DSS. It could also play a different role in dealing with poor performing
authorities (identified using the proposed set of performance indicators
on overpayments).  For example, it could operate ‘task forces’ which
investigate apparent poor performance in respect of the incidence or
recovery of overpayments and work with authorities to identify the sources
of problems and to make urgent improvements.
These ideas for developing the role of the DSS and BFI are not intended
to be comprehensive but to encourage thinking in response to the finding
that some authorities appear to be unwilling or unable to take advantage
of new opportunities to change and improve their administrative practices
and performance.
The dominant picture presented in recent reports about Housing Benefit
is that overpayments are in something of a crisis, characterised by a subsidy
system open to abuse and poor performance by local authorities in the
recovery of overpaid benefit.  The findings from this research paint a
different picture.  There are certainly wide variations in the way authorities
carry out their overpayment work. That much is expected given the
autonomy that they have in administering benefits on behalf of central
government.  However, we found no evidence that the subsidy
arrangements are abused in the way feared by the National Audit Office.
Whether or not local authorities’ performance in relation to overpayment
recovery is bad, indifferent or good must remain an open question until
some robust measures of recovery are established.  What evidence we do
have again suggests a large degree of variation between individual
authorities but we are a long way from knowing the true extent of
overpayment recoveries achieved across the country.
7 The DSS already carries out such activity, for example, in relation to the introduction
of the Housing Benefit Verification Framework.
6.3  Final comments
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There are a number of policy options around overpayments raised in the
course of this research that are worthy of further thought and analysis by
the DSS.  Perhaps the main issue to be addressed, however, is how to
encourage more local authorities to make better use of the range of powers
and provisions already at their disposal.
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TOPIC GUIDE FOR HOUSING BENEFIT MANAGERS
LOCAL AUTHORITY OVERPAYMENT POLICY
Content of policy
1. What is the authority’s general policy on
classification
- are all cases considered recoverable?
recovery of overpayments
- does policy include recovery from landlords (PR OBE)?
- does policy prioritise particular cases (eg fraud)?
allocation of resources
2. Is policy:
new, i.e. recently changed?
in process of change?
under review?
well-established?
Objectives of policy
1. What objectives underlie the authority’s policy?
financial
deterrence
meeting statutory duties
political
Distinctions within policy
1. Are there differences in policy between:
rent rebates, rent allowances, Council Tax Benefit cases?
overpayments caused by fraud and claimant or official errors?
claimants and landlords?
vulnerable groups (such as old people, disabled people)?
2. Why are these distinctions made?
3. What is the policy towards ex-claimants (including those who have left the area)?
4. Is overpayment policy linked with prosecution policy? How?
Responsibility for policy
1. Who is principally responsible for drawing up the policy?
who else is/ was involved?
2. Who is principally responsible for drawing up procedures for day-to-day work?
who else is/ was involved?
Influences on policy
1. What have been the main influences on the way this authority has decided to deal with
overpayments?
PR OBE FULLY FOR  EACH
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2. How has Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 influenced overpayment policy
[NB THESE QUESTIONS AR E OF KEY POLICY INTER EST]
EXPLOR E
changes to the subsidy paid to cases classified as fraud
new powers of recovery
administrative penalties
use of civil court procedures
PR OBE:  How are these powers being used?
PR OBE: For views on new powers: usefulness, problems, why not  used (if appropriate),
comparisons with existing powers
3. FOLLOW UP to explore influences not mentioned so far:
(How, if at all, have the following influenced overpayment
policy, or are currently influencing thinking)
-   the subsidy arrangements
-   WBS
-   other financial considerations
-   DSS (eg in its guidance and circulars)
-   DSS overpayment recovery exercise (NB for relevant LAs only)
-   the DETR  Best Value initiative
-   DETR  and Welsh Office (for Welsh authorities)
-   resources (eg for staff)
-   LA elected members/ council committees
-   LA fraud strategy
-   other LA policies, eg anti-poverty
-   LA targets
-   other key players (eg landlords and advice agencies)
-   R eports from
District Audit
NAO/ Audit Commission (including new indicators on overpayments)
Benefit Fraud Inspectorate
Commons Select Committees.
OVERPAYMENT ADMINISTRATION
Classification of overpayments
1. Check who is involved in classifying overpayments?
How are they trained?
What procedures/ manuals do they work with?
How many designated officers are there for fraud overpayments?
2. Is performance satisfactory?
are overpayments correctly classified?
who checks? how is overpayment classification supervised?
what is role of LA Audit department?
Overpayment recovery
1. Who is involved in recovering overpayments?
How are they trained?
What procedures/ manuals do they work with?
712. What methods of recovery are used in this authority?
e.g. from other LA benefits?
from BA administered benefits?
council tax account?
rent account (for council tenants)?
invoice/ sundry debtors?
is overpaid benefit recovered from landlords?
balance of debt recovery methods?
relevance of costs of different methods?
who decides recovery method and rate of recovery in each case?
3. How are claimants notified about overpayment recovery?
computerised output
personal letter
views on notification procedures
R EPEAT QUESTION IN R ELATION TO LANDLOR DS
1. How is recovery controlled?
when are debts written-off?
who makes write-off decisions?
2. What percentage of overpaid benefit is recovered?
how is this figure monitored?
3. Is overpayment recovery performance satisfactory?
4. Who gets the recovered overpayment?
- Housing Benefit budget
- general LA budget
- somewhere else (specify)
Links with fraud investigation
1. What is the relation between overpayment and the work of fraud/ investigation teams?
Role of other LA departments
1. R ole of other LA departments in relation to overpayments
Finance
Sundry Debts
Audit
Housing
Effect of appeals mechanisms
1. How does appeals work affect overpayment administration?
problems?
2. How many overpayments cases generate an appeal?
3. How many are dealt with by HB department internally?
4. What is success rate for claimants?
5. How many R eview Board cases result?
6. Views on R eview Board decisions?
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Wider effect of overpayments work
1. How does overpayment work affect Housing Benefit administration more generally?
perceived effect on relations between landlords and tenants
on relations between landlords and the authority
Management of overpayment work
1. Who exercises supervisory and managerial control over overpayment work?
does a single officer have overall responsibility?
2. What management information is collected?
Why?
In what form? (eg routine reports/ statistics)
How is it produced? (computer/ manually)
How is it used? By whom?
3. Are there any problems using IT to provide management information?
eg default settings?
4. Are there any problems using IT to provide accurate overpayment data for DSS (or DETR ,
Welsh Office)?
(NB for LAs in recovery data collection exercise only) Any
problems supplying data? How actually did they collate the data?
5. Do any performance targets apply to overpayment work
what are these?
who set them?
who has to meet them?
PR OBE What has been the effect of these?
6. To what extent is overpayments work automated?
recording
case management
recovery (eg sending out standard letters)
production of statistics
7. How is overpayments work co-ordinated with Benefits Agency?
8. How important is overpayment work?
compared with claims processing, fraud investigation etc?
are staff ever moved off overpayment work to cover other tasks?
IMPROVING OVERPAYMENT ADMINISTRATION
Barriers to better performance
1. What needs to happen to encourage LAs to attempt more recoveries?
2. How can better recovery rates be achieved?
EXPLOR E THE FOLLOWING for Q.32 and Q.33 as appropriate):
changes to incentive measures? (PR OBE FULLY)
eg changes to subsidy arrangements. What?
eg changes to WBS arrangements. What?
changes to existing powers of recovery. What?
changes to IT
other changes to Housing Benefit legislation.
changes to appeals procedures.
changes to related LA policies (Housing? Anti-poverty?)
73HB department keeping recovered overpayments
changes to DSS guidance.
software/ automated systems
better co-ordination with:
Housing department
Finance department
Benefits Agency
3. What can the LA do better themselves (i.e. independent of external changes)?
4. Can LA overpayments strategy contribute (more) to deterring fraud?
5. What are your views on how the changing policy environment will affect overpayment work?
e.g DETR  Best Value initiative
Verification Framework initiative
BFI programme of inspections
T O PIC GU ID E FO R  H O U SIN G BEN EFIT  AN D  CO U N CIL T AX  BEN EFIT
OVERPAYMENT WORK
Personal background
1. How long have you worked on overpayments?
2. Any other relevant experience?
on debt recovery?
on fraud/ investigation work?
3. What other duties do you have?
how does overpayment work fit in with other duties?
what priority does it have?
Classifying overpayments
1. How are possible overpayment cases mostly identified? (Check for relative importance of each
source)
routine reviews (eg by post or visit)?
from regular accuracy checks?
from fraud/ investigation teams?
from claimants reporting changes in circumstances?
from special exercises?
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2. What is your role? (CHECK: if respondent says no to any of the following, ask who is responsible
for each)
deciding if overpayment exists?
deciding if an overpayment is recoverable or not?
deciding amount of overpayment?
deciding cause of overpayment?
deciding whether to recover?
deciding whether a case is a possible fraud?
deciding whether to apply an administrative penalty/ prosecute
3. How do you decide if an overpayment exists?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
4. How do you decide if an overpayment is recoverable or not?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
PR OBE for interpretation of ‘reasonably expected to know’ in cases of official error
5. How do you decide the amount of an overpayment?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
automated calculations (eg by LA computer systems)
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
6. How do you decide whether to recover?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
automated calculations (eg by LA computer systems)
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
7. How do you decide the cause of an overpayment?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
legislation/ regulations
75LA policies/ guidance/ instructions
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
PR OBE for influence of subsidy arrangements
8. How do you decide if an overpayment case is possibly fraudulent?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
9. What action is then taken on a fraudulent overpayment?
10. How does a classification of fraud affect overpayment work?
do fraud cases receive priority?
are other types of case prioritised? (eg when resources are limited)
11. How do you record the classification?
on casefile
computer system  (EXPLOR E whether system has defaults/ standard settings, and
process of overriding these manually if appropriate)
any problems associated with recording (eg with computer systems)
Recovering overpayments
1. What is your role in the recovery of overpayments?
deciding the method of recovery
communicating with claimants
dealing with claimants enquiries
dealing with appeals
communicating with landlords
dealing with landlords’ enquiries
involvement in prosecutions (specify)
2. How do you decide whether to recover from the claimant or the landlord?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
3. How do you decide the method of recovery for claimants?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
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PR OBE for perceptions of the effectiveness of different methods  and effect on decision making,
i.e.
deductions from Housing Benefit
posting to Council Tax account
deductions from BA-administered benefits
posting to housing account
raising invoice
4. How do you decide the method of recovery for landlords?
EXPLOR E USE OF:
legislation/ regulations
LA policies/ guidance
DSS guidance
other guidance (specify)
own and colleagues’ knowledge (explore and specify, probe for examples)
own discretion and judgment (explore and probe for examples)
PR OBE for perceptions of the effectiveness of different methods and effect on decision making,
i.e.
deductions from Housing Benefit of overpaid claimant
deductions from Housing Benefit of other claimants
raising invoice
PR OBE Does cost of recovery have a bearing on decisions? (cf. the amount of the overpayment)
5. What happens when the recovery method is decided?
EXPLOR E: liaison with other LA departments
6. How are claimants informed of the requirement to repay an overpayment?
standard letter?
personal letter?
visits?
how are appeal rights explained?
views on content/ style of letter?
any problems with letter?
R EPEAT QUESTION IN R ELATION TO LANDLOR DS
1. To what extent is overpayments recovery automated?
recording
case management
production of standard letters
PR OBE for impact of IT on recovery work
2. In general, how do claimants’ react to overpayment notifications? What other reactions have
you come across?
what role do you have now?
R EPEAT QUESTION IN R ELATION TO LANDLOR DS
3. What are claimants’ actions/ responses to repaying overpaid benefit
e.g. no problems, debt settled without problems
further contact from claimant (specify/ examples)
problems (specify/ examples)
R EPEAT QUESTION IN R ELATION TO LANDLOR DS
774. Would you say there is a better chance of getting recovery from a ‘fraud’ case than an ‘error’
case?
5. What happens when debt repayment arrangements break down?
who is involved
what options are available
when is action in the civil courts considered
what influences decisions about civil action (EXAMPLES?)
6. Do you have a role in writing-off bad debts?
PR OBE FULLY
Distinctions between types of overpayment case
1. Are the following groups treated differently from each other:
rent rebates, rent allowances, Council Tax Benefit cases?
overpayments caused by fraud and claimant or official errors?
claimants and landlords?
vulnerable groups (such as old people, disabled people)?
2. Why are these distinctions made?
3. How do you deal with ex-claimants (including those who have left the area)?
4. In general, would you say you had a particular view or approach to overpayments work?
How does this influence how you carry out your duties?
Appeals
1. What happens if a claimant appeals?
EXPLOR E own role and links with Appeals section
estimate of how many overpayment cases generate an appeal?
how often do appeals involve landlords?
how are these appeals dealt with?
Influence on decisions of subsidy and WBS [NB THESE QUESTIONS AR E OF KEY POLICY
INTER EST]
1. Explore knowledge of relationship between overpayments and:
LA subsidy arrangements
WBS
How do they play a part in decisions on individual overpayment cases?
1. Explore knowledge of new powers under Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997,
including:
new powers of recovery
administrative penalties
How do they play a part in decisions on individual overpayment cases?
Role of other LA departments
1. What dealings do you have with other LA departments in relation to overpayments
Finance
Audit
Housing
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2. How is overpayments work co-ordinated with Benefits Agency?
how do you arrange to recover an overpayment from a different benefit?
any problems?
Training
1. What training have you received on overpayments work?
When?
Strengths and weaknesses?
Training gaps and needs?
PR OBE for use of DSS guidance in training, and views on usefulness (if not covered earlier in interview)
Management of overpayment work
1. Who exercises supervisory and managerial control over your overpayment work?
2. Are you responsible for any statistics on overpayments?
What?
In what form? (eg routine reports/ statistics)
How are statistics produced? (computer/ manually)
2. Do you have any performance targets linked to overpayment work
what are these?
who set them?
who has to meet them?
views?
How do targets play a part in decisions on individual overpayment cases?
1. How important is overpayment work?
compared with claims processing, fraud investigation etc?
are you ever moved off overpayment work to cover other tasks?
Knowledge of policy environment
1. Do you get to read, or discuss, any of the following:
R eports from
District Audit
NAO/ Audit Commission (including new indicators on overpayments)
Benefit Fraud Inspectorate
Commons Select Committees.
IMPROVING OVERPAYMENT ADMINISTRATION
Barriers to better performance
1. How could what you do be improved?
792. What are the barriers to better performance/ outcomes? How could things be done better?
EXPLOR E THE FOLLOWING:
subsidy arrangements
WBS
existing powers of recovery
Housing Benefit legislation
appeals procedures
related LA policies (Housing? Anti-poverty?)
LA procedures/ guidance
IT systems
DSS guidance
liaison with other LA departments (eg sundry debtors)
co-ordination with:
Housing department
Finance department
Benefits Agency
3. Can LA overpayments strategy contribute (more) to deterring fraud?
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KEY TO SELECTION CRITERIAAPPENDIX B
‘Size’ is defined by total expenditure on benefits in 1997/ 98.  For London
Boroughs, Metropolitan authorities and English districts and unitary
authorities, authorities have been placed into one of three categories:
• Large = top third of expenditure (within local authority type)
• Medium = middle third
• Small =  lowest third
For Scotland and Wales, because only two authorities were needed for the
sample, authorities were divided into two groups, defined as either above or
below the median value:
• Large = above the median value of total expenditure (within local authority
type)
• Small =  below the median
‘Overpayment level’ is defined as the total amount of overpayments for all
benefits as a percentage of total expenditure on benefits in 1997/ 98.
Categories of ‘high’, ‘medium’, and ‘low’ are defined as for large, medium
and small ‘Local authority size’ above.
‘OP recovery rate’ data are available only for those authorities taking part in
a DSS exercise between April and June 1998.
For those authorities returning data, the ‘OP recovery rate’ is defined as the
amount of money recovered in the study period (April-June 1998) as a
percentage of the amount of overpayments made in the same period.  Some
authorities therefore record recovery rates of over 100 per cent.  The median
value was 75 per cent.  Local authorities are defined as having either a ‘high’
recovery rate (i.e. above the median value) or ‘low’ (below the median).
This category is self-explanatory. Political control was correct before the
local government elections in May 1999.
• Lab = Labour
• Con = Conservative
• LD = Liberal Democrat
• NOC = no overall control.
‘Size of PR S’ is defined as percentage of caseload receiving rent allowance
(excluding Housing Association tenants) as a percentage of total Housing
Benefit caseload (using data supplied by DSS for May 1998).  Within each
authority type, local authorities are defined as having either a ‘high’ PR S
(i.e. above the median value) or ‘low’ (below the median).
Local authority size (‘Size’)
Overpayment level
Overpayment recovery rate
Political control
Size of private rented sector
(‘Size of PR S’)
82
This category is defined as those authorities whose BFI inspection visit was
completed by December 1998.  All reports were in the public domain when
the project began on 5 April 1999.
This category is defined as those authorities which have contracted out some
or all aspects of their Housing Benefit administration according to data
supplied by DSS.
Benefit Fraud Inspectorate
(BFI) report
Private contract
Table B.1 Summary of the achieved sample
Criterion Category Number of local authorities in sample
English
English District and
London Metropolitan Unitary Scottish Welsh
Boroughs Authorities Authorities Authorities Authorities
Size Large 1 1 3 1 1
Medium 1 2 2 N/A N/A
Small 1 0 3 1 1
Overpayment level High 1 1 4 1 1
Medium 2 1 3 N/A N/A
Low 0 1 1 1 1
Overpayment recovery rate1 High 0 1 2 1 Not known
Low 3 1 1 Not known Not known
Political control Lab 2 3 2 1 2
Con 1 0 1 0 0
LD 0 0 2 0 0
NOC 0 0 3 1 0
Size of PRS High 1 1 6 1 1
Low 2 2 2 1 1
BFI report Yes 0 1 2 1 0
No 3 2 6 1 2
Private contract Yes 1 0 1 0 0
No 2 3 7 2 2
1 Data were available for only nine authorities
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Benefit Fraud Inspectorate reports analysed for this research
Blackpool Borough Council
Broxbourne Borough Council
London Borough of Croydon
Dundee City Council
Eastbourne Borough Council
East Devon District Council
East Dunbartonshire Council
East Lothian Council
Elmbridge Borough Council
Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council
Inverclyde Council
Ipswich Borough Council
Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council
Leicester City Council
Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council
London Borough of R ichmond upon Thames
South Ayrshire Council
Stoke-on-Trent City Council
Telford and Wrekin Council
Teesdale District Council
Thanet District Council
London Borough of Tower Hamlets
Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council
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OTHER RESEARCH REPORTS AVAILABLE:
No. Title ISBN Price
1. Thirty Families: Their living standards 0 11 761683 4 £ 6.65
in unemployment
2. Disability, Household Income & 0 11 761755 5 £ 5.65
Expenditure
3. Housing Benefit R eviews 0 11 761821 7 £ 16.50
4. Social Security & Community Care: 0 11 761820 9 £ 9.70
The case of the Invalid Care Allowance
5. The Attendance Allowance Medical 0 11 761819 5 £ 5.50
Examination: Monitoring consumer
views
6. Lone Parent Families in the UK 0 11 761868 3 £ 15.00
7. Incomes In and Out of Work 0 11 761910 8 £ 17.20
8. Working the Social Fund 0 11 761952 3 £ 9.00
9. Evaluating the Social Fund 0 11 761953 1 £ 22.00
10. Benefits Agency National Customer 0 11 761956 6 £ 16.00
Survey 1991
11. Customer Perceptions of R esettlement 0 11 761976 6 £ 13.75
Units
12. Survey of Admissions to London 0 11 761977 9 £ 8.00
R esettlement Units
13. R esearching the Disability Working 0 11 761834 9 £ 7.25
Allowance Self Assessment Form
14. Child Support Unit National Client 0 11 762060 2 £ 15.00
Survey 1992
15. Preparing for Council Tax Benefit 0 11 762061 0 £ 5.65
16. Contributions Agency Customer 0 11 762064 5 £ 18.00
Satisfaction Survey 1992
17. Employers’ Choice of Pension 0 11 762073 4 £ 5.00
Schemes: R eport of a qualitative study
18. GPs and IVB: A qualitative study of the 0 11 762077 7 £ 12.00
role of GPs in the award of
Invalidity Benefit
19. Invalidity Benefit: A survey of 0 11 762087 4 £ 10.75
recipients
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20. Invalidity Benefit: A longitudinal 0 11 762088 2 £ 19.95
survey of new recipients
21. Support for Children: A comparison of 0 11 762089 0 £ 22.95
arrangements in fifteen countries
22. Pension Choices: A survey on personal 0 11 762091 2 £ 18.95
pensions in comparison with other
pension options
23. Crossing National Frontiers 0 11 762131 5 £ 17.75
24. Statutory Sick Pay 0 11 762147 1 £ 23.75
25. Lone Parents and Work 0 11 762147 X £ 12.95
26. The Effects of Benefit on Housing 0 11 762157 9 £ 18.50
Decisions
27. Making a Claim for Disability Benefits 0 11 762162 5 £ 12.95
28. Contributions Agency Customer 0 11 762220 6 £ 20.00
Satisfaction Survey 1993
29. Child Support Agency National Client 0 11 762224 9 £ 33.00
Satisfaction Survey 1993
30. Lone Mothers 0 11 762228 1 £ 16.75
31. Educating Employers 0 11 762249 4 £ 8.50
32. Employers and Family Credit 0 11 762272 9 £ 13.50
33. Direct Payments from Income Support 0 11 762290 7 £ 16.50
34. Incomes and Living Standards of 0 11 762299 0 £ 24.95
Older People
35. Choosing Advice on Benefits 0 11 762316 4 £ 13.95
36. First-time Customers 0 11 762317 2 £ 25.00
37. Contributions Agency National 0 11 762339 3 £ 21.00
Client Satisfaction Survey 1994
38. Managing Money in Later Life 0 11 762340 7 £ 22.00
39. Child Support Agency National 0 11 762341 5 £ 35.00
Client Satisfaction Survey 1994
40. Changes in Lone Parenthood 0 11 7632349 0 £ 20.00
41. Evaluation of Disability Living 0 11 762351 2 £ 40.00
Allowance and Attendance
Allowance
42. War Pensions Agency Customer 0 11 762358 X £ 18.00
Satisfaction Survey 1994
43. Paying for R ented Housing 0 11 762370 9 £ 19.00
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44. R esettlement Agency Customer 0 11 762371 7 £ 16.00
Satisfaction Survey 1994
45. Changing Lives and the R ole of 0 11 762405 5 £ 20.00
Income Support
46. Social Assistance in OECD Countries: 0 11 762407 1 £ 22.00
Synthesis R eport
47. Social Assistance in OECD Countries: 0 11 762408 X £ 47.00
Country R eport
48. Leaving Family Credit 0 11 762411 X £ 18.00
49. Women and Pensions 0 11 762422 5 £ 35.00
50. Pensions and Divorce 0 11 762423 5 £ 25.00
51. Child Support Agency Client 0 11 762424 1 £ 22.00
Satisfaction Survey 1995
52. Take Up of Second Adult R ebate 0 11 762390 3 £ 17.00
53. Moving off Income Support 0 11 762394 6 £ 26.00
54. Disability, Benefits and Employment 0 11 762398 9 £ 30.00
55. Housing Benefit and Service Charges 0 11 762399 7 £ 25.00
56. Confidentiality: The public view 0 11 762434 9 £ 25.00
57. Helping Disabled Workers 0 11 762440 3 £ 25.00
58. Employers’ Pension Provision 1994 0 11 762443 8 £ 30.00
59. Delivering Social Security: A cross– 0 11 762447 0 £ 35.00
national study
60. A Comparative Study of Housing 0 11 762448 9 £ 26.00
Allowances
61. Lone Parents, Work and Benefits 0 11 762450 0 £ 25.00
62. Unemployment and Jobseeking 0 11 762452 7 £ 30.00
63. Exploring Customer Satisfaction 0 11 762468 3 £ 20.00
64. Social Security Fraud: The role of 0 11 762471 3 £ 30.00
penalties
65. Customer Contact with the Benefits 0 11 762533 7 £ 30.00
Agency
66. Pension Scheme Inquiries and Disputes 0 11 762534 5 £ 30.00
67. Maternity R ights and Benefits in 0 11 762536 1 £ 35.00
Britain
68. Claimants’ Perceptions of the Claim 0 11 762541 8 £ 23.00
Process
69. Delivering Benefits to Unemployed 0 11 762553 1 £ 27.00
People
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70. Delivering Benefits to Unemployed 0 11 762557 4 £ 20.00
16–17 year olds
71. Stepping–Stones to Employment 0 11 762568 X £ 27.00
72. Dynamics of R etirement 0 11 762571 X £ 36.00
73. Unemployment and Jobseeking before 0 11 762576 0 £ 34.00
Jobseeker’s Allowance
74. Customer views on Service Delivery 0 11 762583 3 £ 27.00
in the Child Support Agency
75. Experiences of Occupational Pension 0 11 762584 1 £ 27.00
Scheme Wind–Up
76. R ecruiting Long–Term Unemployed 0 11 762585 X £ 27.00
People
77. What Happens to Lone Parents 0 11 762598 3 £ 31.00
78. Lone Parents Lives 0 11 762598 1 £ 34.00
79. Moving into Work: Bridging Housing 0 11 762599 X £ 33.00
Costs
80. Lone Parents on the Margins of Work 1 84123 000 6 £ 26.00
81. The R ole of Pension Scheme Trustees 1 84123 001 4 £ 28.00
82. Pension Scheme Investment Policies 1 84123 002 2 £ 28.00
83. Pensions and R etirement Planning 1 84123 003 0 £ 28.00
84. Self–Employed People and National 1 84123 004 9 £ 28.00
Insurance Contributions
85. Getting the Message Across 1 84123 052 9 £ 26.00
86. Leaving Incapacity Benefit 1 84123 087 1 £ 34.00
87. Unemployment and Jobseeking: 1 84123 088 X £ 38.00
Two Years On
88. Attitudes to the Welfare State and 1 84123 098 7 £ 36.00
the R esponse to R eform
89. New Deal for Lone Parents: 1 84123 101 0 £ 26.00
Evaluation of Innovative Schemes
90. Modernising service delivery: 1 84123 103 7 £ 26.00
The Lone Parent Prototype
91. Housing Benefit exceptional hardship 1 84123 104 5 £ 26.00
payments
92. New Deal for Lone Parents: 1 84123 107 X £ 29.00
Learning from the Prototype Areas
93. Housing Benefit and Supported 1 84123 118 5 £ 31.50
Accommodation
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94. Disability in Great Britain 1 84123 119 3 £ 35.00
95. Low paid work in Britain 1 84123 120 7 £ 37.00
96. Keeping in touch with the Labour
Market 1 84123 126 6 £ 28.50
97. Housing Benefit and Council Tax
Benefit delivery: Claimant experiences 1 84123 127 4 £ 24.00
98. Employers’ Pension Provision 1996 1 84123 138 X £ 31.50
99. Unemployment and jobseeking after
the introduction of Jobseeker’s
Allowance 1 84123 146 0 £ 33.00
100. Overcoming barriers: Older people
and Income Support 1 84123 148 7 £ 29.00
101. Attitudes and aspirations of older
people: A review of the literature 1 84123 144 4 £ 34.00
102. Attitudes and aspirations of older
people: A qualitative study 1 84123 158 4 £ 29.00
103. R elying on the state,
relying on each other 1 84123 163 0 £ 27.00
104. Modernising Service Delivery:
The Integrated Services Prototype 1 84123 162 2 £ 27.00
105. Helping pensioners: Evaluation of
the Income Support Pilots 1 84123 164 9 £ 30.00
106. New Deal for disabled people:
Early implementation 1 84123 165 7 £ 39.50
107. Parents and employment: An analysis
of low income families in the British
Household Panel Survey 1 84123 167 3 £ 28.50
108. Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone
Parents: Early lessons from the Phase
One Prototype Synthesis R eport 1 84123 187 8 £ 27.50
109. Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone
Parents: Early lessons from the Phase
One Prototype Findings of Surveys 1 84123 3190 8 £ 42.50
110. Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone
Parents: Early lessons from the Phase
One Prototype Cost-benefit and
econometric analyses 1 84123 188 6 £ 29.50
111. Understanding the Impact of
Jobseeker’s Allowance 1 84123 192 4 £ 37.50
112. The First Effects of Earning Top-up 1 84123 193 2 £ 39.50
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113. Piloting change: Interim Qualitative
Findings from the Earnings
Top-up Evaluation 1 84123 194 0 £ 28.50
114. Building Up Pension R ights 1 84123 195 9 £ 33.50
115. Prospects of part-time work:The
impact of the Back to Work Bonus 1 84123 196 7 £ 29.00
116. Evaluating Jobseeker’s Allowance 1 84123 197 5 £ 16.00
117. Pensions and divorce:
The 1998 Survey 1 84123 198 3 £ 36.00
118. Pensions and divorce:
Exploring financial settlements 1 84123 199 1 £ 24.00
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 761747 4 £ 8.00
1990–91
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 761833 0 £ 12.00
1991–92
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762150 1 £ 13.75
1992–93
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762302 4 £ 16.50
1993–94
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762362 8 £ 20.00
1994–95
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 761446 2 £ 20.00
1995–96
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762570 1 £ 27.00
1996–97
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 1 84123 086 3 £ 34.00
1997–98
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 1 84123 161 4 £ 30.00
1998–99
Further information regarding the content of the above may be obtained
from:
Department of Social Security
Attn. Keith Watson
Social R esearch Branch
Analytical Services Division 5
4-26 Adelphi
1–11 John Adam Street
London WC2N 6HT
